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A MODEL REGIME OF PRIVACY 
PROTECTION 
Daniel J. Solove* 
Chris Jay Hoofnagle** 
A series of major security breaches at companies with sensitive 
personal information has sparked significant attention to the prob-
lems with privacy protection in the United States.  Currently, the pri-
vacy protections in the United States are riddled with gaps and weak 
spots.  Although most industrialized nations have comprehensive data 
protection laws, the United States has maintained a sectoral approach 
where certain industries are covered and others are not.  In particular, 
emerging companies known as “commercial data brokers” have fre-
quently slipped through the cracks of U.S. privacy law.  In this article, 
the authors propose a Model Privacy Regime to address the problems 
in the privacy protection in the United States, with a particular focus 
on commercial data brokers.  Since the United States is unlikely to 
shift radically from its sectoral approach to a comprehensive data 
protection regime, the Model Regime aims to patch up the holes in ex-
isting privacy regulation and improve and extend it.  In other words, 
the goal of the Model Regime is to build upon the existing foundation 
of U.S. privacy law, not to propose an alternative foundation.  The 
authors believe that the sectoral approach in the United States can be 
improved by applying the Fair Information Practices—principles that 
require the entities that collect personal data to extend certain rights to 
data subjects.  The Fair Information Practices are very general prin-
ciples, and they are often spoken about in a rather abstract manner.  
In contrast, the Model Regime demonstrates specific ways that they 
can be incorporated into privacy regulation in the United States.    
 
 *  Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.  Professor Solove 
has discussed many of the problems and solutions herein in his book, The Digital Person: Technology 
and Privacy in the Information Age (2004). 
 ** Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center West Coast Office.  Chris Hoofnagle has 
discussed many of the problems and solutions herein in his articles, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How 
ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforce-
ment, 29 N.C.J INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595 (2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=582302; and Put-
ting Identity Theft on Ice: Freezing Credit Reports to Prevent Lending to Impostors, Jan. 5, 2005, http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=679581.  Marc Rotenberg of the Electronic Privacy Information Center and Beth 
Givens of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse have provided substantial comments which are incorpo-
rated in an earlier iteration. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Privacy protection in the United States has often been criticized, but 
critics have too infrequently suggested specific proposals for reform.  Re-
cently, there has been significant legislative interest at both the federal 
and state levels in addressing the privacy of personal information.  This 
was sparked when ChoicePoint, one of the largest data brokers in the 
United States with records on almost every adult American citizen, de-
clared that it sold data on about 145,000 people to fraudulent businesses 
set up by identity thieves.1  Other companies announced security 
breaches, including LexisNexis, from which personal information belong-
ing to about 310,000 people was improperly accessed.2  Senator Schumer 
criticized Westlaw for making available to certain subscribers personal 
information including Social Security Numbers (SSNs).3 
In the aftermath of the ChoicePoint debacle and other major infor-
mation security breaches, both of us have been asked by Congressional 
legislative staffers, state legislative policymakers, journalists, academics, 
and others about what specifically should be done to better regulate in-
formation privacy.  In response to this question, we believe that it is im-
perative to have a discussion of concrete legislative solutions to privacy 
problems. 
What appears below is our attempt at such an endeavor.  Privacy 
experts have long suggested that information collection be consistent 
with Fair Information Practices.  This Model Regime incorporates many 
of those practices and applies them specifically to the context of com-
mercial data brokers such as ChoicePoint.  We hope that this will provide 
useful guidance to legislators and policymakers in crafting laws and regu-
lations.  We also intend this to be a work-in-progress in which we col-
laborate with others.  We have welcomed input from other academics, 
policymakers, journalists, and experts, as well as from the industries and 
businesses that will be subject to the regulations we propose.  We have 
incorporated criticisms and constructive suggestions, and we will con-
tinue to update this Model Regime to include the comments we find 
most helpful and illuminating. 
 
 1. Joseph Menn, Did the ChoicePoint End Run Backfire?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at C1; 
Bob Sullivan, Database Giant Gives Access to Fake Firms: ChoicePoint Warns More than 30,000 They 
May Be at Risk, MSNBC, Feb. 14, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6969799/.  In November 2005, 
ChoicePoint informed an additional 17,000 individuals that their personal data may also have been 
compromised, bringing the total number to 162,000.  Michael Hiltzik, Big Data Broker Eyes DMV Re-
cords, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2005, at C1. 
 2. David Colker, LexisNexis Breach Is Larger: The company reveals that personal data files on 
as many as 310,000 people were accessed, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2005, at C1. 
 3. Ken Fireman, Identity Theft Made Easy, Schumer Warns, NEWSDAY, Feb. 25, 2005, at A02. 
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II. U.S. PRIVACY LAW AND THE DATABASE INDUSTRY 
Currently, the collection and use of personal data by businesses and 
government is spinning out of control.  An entire industry devoted pri-
marily to processing and disseminating personal information has arisen, 
and this industry is not well-regulated.  Many companies brokering in 
data have found ways to avoid being regulated by the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act (FCRA),4 a landmark law passed in 1970 to regulate con-
sumer reporting agencies.  Increasingly, the government is relying on 
data-broker companies to supply personal data for intelligence and law 
enforcement purposes.  As a result, the government is navigating around 
the protections of the Privacy Act of 1974,5 a law passed to regulate the 
collection and use of data by government agencies.  The FCRA and Pri-
vacy Act form the basic framework that regulates a large portion of the 
flow of personal data, but this framework is riddled with exceptions and 
shunted with limitations.  We propose a Model Regime of Privacy Pro-
tection to address these problems. 
A. The Fair Credit Reporting Act 
The database industry has its roots in the rise of consumer reporting 
agencies—companies that gather and sell personal information on indi-
viduals for business purposes.  The consumer reporting industry began 
over a century ago.  The first major consumer reporting agency, Retail 
Credit Co., was founded in 1899, and over the years, it grew in size and 
began selling reports about individuals to insurers and employers.6 
By the 1960s, significant controversy surrounded the credit report-
ing agencies. There were questionable practices in the industry, including 
requirements that investigators fill quotas of negative information on 
data subjects.7  To do this, some investigators fabricated negative infor-
mation; others included incomplete information.8  Additionally, the in-
vestigators were collecting “lifestyle” information on data subjects, in-
cluding their sexual orientation, marital situation, drinking habits, and 
cleanliness.9  The credit-reporting agencies were maintaining outdated 
information and, in some cases, providing the file to law enforcement 
and to unauthorized persons.  Individuals had no right to see what was in 
their files.  Public exposure of the industry resulted in an extensive con-
 
 4. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000). 
 5. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000). 
 6. ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM 
PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 316 (2000). 
 7. See id. at 316–21. 
 8. Id. at 316–18. 
 9. Id. at 316–19. 
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gressional inquiry and ultimately led to the passage of the FCRA in 
1970.10 
The FCRA was the first federal law to regulate private-sector use 
and disclosure of personal information.  At the most basic level, the 
FCRA requires consumer reporting agencies to maintain procedures to 
ensure “maximum possible accuracy.”11  The law regulates the collection, 
maintenance, and dissemination of “consumer reports.”12  Consumer re-
ports can only be used for a series of enumerated purposes, such as for 
determining eligibility for credit or engaging in employment background 
checks.13  Consumer reporting agencies must allow people access to their 
records and must provide a telephone number for people to call to voice 
a complaint.14  Consumer reporting agencies must investigate any mis-
takes that people point out in their files.15  Any user of a credit report 
taking adverse action on a person based on a consumer report must no-
tify the person about this fact.16  When employers (both prospective and 
current) want to examine a person’s credit report, they must first obtain 
the person’s consent.17  If the employer takes any adverse action based 
on the report, the employer must inform the person and provide instruc-
tions to obtain a copy of the report.18  Under the FCRA, law enforce-
ment has a number of avenues to access consumer reports, some of 
which require an annual accounting to Congress.  Full consumer reports 
can be accessed by court order, by grand jury subpoena, or by request of 
a child support enforcement agency.19  The Act allows the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation (FBI) access to individuals’ account information 
and identifying information for counterintelligence purposes upon writ-
ten request.20 
B. The Privacy Act 
The Privacy Act of 1974 was created in response to concerns about 
how the creation and use of computerized databases might impact indi-
viduals’ privacy rights.21  As technology advanced through the 1960s and 
70s, it became easier for agencies to cross-reference individuals’ personal 
data.  Citizens and legislators began to contemplate the ways that this in-
 
 10. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000). 
 11. Id. § 1681e(b). 
 12. Id. § 1681. 
 13. Id. § 1681b. 
 14. Id. § 1681g. 
 15. Id. § 1681i. 
 16. Id. § 1681m(a). 
 17. Id. § 1681b(b). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. § 1681b. 
 20. Id. § 1681u. 
 21. PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 71–82 (1995). 
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formation, if compiled, could be abused.  In 1973, the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) issued a report recommending 
that Congress enact legislation adopting a Code of Fair Information 
Practices for record systems containing personal data.22  This Code con-
sisted of the following principles: 
x There must be no personal data record-keeping system whose 
very existence is secret.23 
x There must be a way for an individual to find out what informa-
tion about him is in a record and how it is used.24 
x There must be a way for an individual to prevent information 
about him that was obtained for one purpose from being used 
or made available for other purposes without his consent.25 
x There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a re-
cord of identifiable information about him.26 
x Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating 
records of identifiable personal data must assure the reliability 
of the data for their intended use and must take precaution to 
prevent misuse of the data.27 
The HEW Report also raised concerns about the use of the SSN, 
which was fast becoming a “standard universal identifier” that would link 
all of the records kept on a person by all agencies.  The HEW Report 
recommended that the use of SSNs should be strictly curbed.28 
The Privacy Act grew out of the HEW Report.  The Act requires 
government agencies to show people any records kept on them.29  It re-
quires agencies to follow the Fair Information Practices when gathering 
and handling personal data.30  Agencies must provide people with access 
and correction rights, limit data-collection to that necessary to fulfill a 
specified government function, and destroy data after a certain period of 
time.  The Privacy Act places restrictions on how agencies can share an 
individual’s data with other people and agencies.31  Finally, the Act per-
mits individuals to sue government agencies for violations.32  The FCRA 
and Privacy Act have thus provided a basic framework of privacy protec-
 
 22. SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYS., U.S. DEPT. OF 
HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973), available 
at http://epic.org/privacy/hew1973report (follow “Summary and Recommendations” hyperlink). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (2000). 
 30. Id. § 552a(e); see also Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of 
Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1. 
 31. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). 
 32. Id. § 552a(g). 
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tion, with the FCRA addressing the key private sector uses of personal 
data and the Privacy Act addressing public sector uses. 
C. The Database Industry 
A number of companies have arisen apart from the consumer re-
porting agencies or have spun off of the consumer reporting agencies.  
These companies’ primary business is gathering, analyzing, and dissemi-
nating personal data.  One such company is ChoicePoint, Inc., based in 
Alpharetta, Georgia, which spun off from consumer reporting agency 
Equifax in 1997.33  ChoicePoint sells information and data services to in-
surers, businesses, government agencies, and direct marketers.34  In 2004, 
the company reported total revenue of nearly $1 billion.35 
In its short history, ChoicePoint has managed to attain a large share 
of the commercial data broker market with strategic purchases of other 
businesses.  In 2000, ChoicePoint purchased DBT Online, Inc., a success-
ful commercial data broker that provides “AutoTrackXP,” a favored law 
enforcement-oriented service.36  In all, ChoicePoint has acquired over 
fifty database companies.37  ChoicePoint has thousands of clients and 
sells services to 7,000 federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.38 
There are many similar types of companies.  Acxiom, for example, 
is “a billion-dollar player in the data industry, with details about nearly 
every adult in the United States.”39  Acxiom provides information to 
marketers for profiling consumers, manages credit records, sells data for 
background checks, and provides data to government agencies: 
It’s not just names, ages, addresses, and telephone numbers.  The 
computers in [Acxiom’s] rooms also hold billions of records about 
marital status and families and the ages of children.  They track in-
dividuals’ estimated incomes, the value of their homes, the make 
and price of their cars.  They maintain unlisted phone numbers and 
details about people’s occupations, religions, and ethnicities.  They 
 
 33. ChoicePoint Inc., General Form for Registration of Securities Pursuant to Section 12(b) or 
12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 10) (June 6, 1997), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/1040596/0000950144-97-006666.txt. 
 34. See EPIC ChoicePoint Page, http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/ (last visited Sept. 13, 
2005). 
 35. ChoicePoint Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 5 (Mar. 15, 2005), available at http://www. 
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1040596/000095014405002577/g93507e10vk.htm#102. 
 36. ChoicePoint Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Mar. 26, 2003), available at http://www. 
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1040596/000095014401500429/g68168e10-k.txt. 
 37. ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 130 (2005). 
 38. Testimony of Derek Smith: Before the Subcomm. On Commerce, Trade and Consumer Pro-
tection of the H. Energy and Commerce Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Derek Smith, 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, ChoicePoint Inc.), available at http://energycommerce.house. 
gov/108/Hearings/03152005hearing1455/Smith.pdf. 
 39. O’HARROW, supra note 37, at 34. 
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sometimes know what some people read, what they order over the 
phone and online, and where they go on vacation.40 
LexisNexis is a corporation owned by the United Kingdom-based 
Reed Elsevier that offers access to numerous databases and information 
retrieval services.41  Through services such as its featured search tool 
“SmartLinx,” LexisNexis offers access to SSNs, addresses, licenses, real 
estate holdings, bankruptcies, liens, marital status, and other personal in-
formation.42 
ChoicePoint, Acxiom, and LexisNexis are three of the larger data 
brokers.  There are many other companies that comprise this industry.  
The database industry provides data to companies for marketing, to the 
government for law enforcement purposes, to private investigators for 
investigating individuals, to creditors for credit checks, and to employers 
for background checks. 
The government increasingly has been contracting with data bro-
kers.  For example, ChoicePoint has multimillion dollar contracts with at 
least thirty-five federal agencies, including the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) and the FBI.43  The United States Marshals Service uses Lex-
isNexis for “location of witnesses, suspects, informants, criminals, parol-
ees in criminal investigations, location of witnesses, [and] parties in civil 
actions.”44  LexisNexis’s Person Tracker Plus Social Security number is a 
private library “designed to meet the needs of law enforcement.”45  It 
provides information probably derived from credit headers, including 
name, SSN, current address, two prior addresses, aliases, birth date, and 
telephone number.46  After 9/11, Acxiom positioned itself as “an anti-
terrorism company” by actively pursuing ways to manage personal in-
formation for the government.47  Charles Morgan, Acxiom’s CEO, stated 
after 9/11 that “we developed a sense among the leadership at Acxiom 
that for this country to be a safer place [the government] had to be able 
to work with information better.”48 
The government is becoming increasingly interested in data-mining 
technologies.  Data mining involves searching through repositories of 
data to find out new information by combining existing data or to make 
 
 40. Id. at 36. 
 41. LexisNexis Company History, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/presscenter/mediakit/history.asp 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2004). 
 42. LexisNexis SmartLinx, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/smartlinx/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2004). 
 43. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 169 (2004). 
 44. Exhibit B, Lexis-Nexis Select Limited Distribution Authorized Use List 6 (1998), available at 
http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02a.pdf. 
 45. Lexis-Nexis Fax Bulletin 39, available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02e. 
pdf. 
 46. Id. 
 47. O’HARROW, supra note 37, at 60. 
 48. Id. at 58. 
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predictions about future behavior based on patterns in the data.49  One of 
the government’s most notable attempts to engage in data-mining re-
search was the Total Information Awareness program, run by John 
Poindexter in the Department of Defense (DOD), which received con-
siderable media attention in late 2002.50  The idea was to gather various 
records about individuals from businesses and then analyze it for pat-
terns of terrorist behavior.  Due to sharp criticism, the Senate denied 
funding to the program in 2003.51 
However, government data-mining programs did not die with Total 
Information Awareness.  According to the Report of the Technology and 
Privacy Advisory Committee (TAPAC), appointed by Secretary of De-
fense Donald Rumsfeld, Total Information Awareness is “not unique in 
its potential for data mining.  TAPAC is aware of many other programs in 
use or under development both within DOD and elsewhere in the gov-
ernment that make similar uses of personal information concerning U.S. 
persons to detect and deter terrorist activities.”52  In light of the intense 
criticism that Total Information Awareness generated, government 
agencies have moved data mining projects underground.  Increasingly, 
such data analysis is being outsourced to database companies.  Choice-
Point vice president James Zimbardi declared:  “We do act as an intelli-
gence agency, gathering data, applying analytics.”53 
D. The Limits of U.S. Privacy Law 
The FCRA and the Privacy Act do not adequately address the ac-
tivities of the database industry.  The FCRA applies to “any consumer 
reporting agency” that furnishes a “consumer report.”54  The definition 
of “consumer reporting agency” is any person who “regularly engages” 
in collecting information about consumers “for the purpose of furnishing 
consumer reports to third parties.”55  This definition turns on the mean-
ing of “consumer report,” which is the key term that defines the scope of 
the FCRA.  Unfortunately, the FCRA has a poorly drafted definition of 
“consumer report” that has allowed some to unduly narrow the FCRA 
coverage.  The FCRA conditions the definition of “consumer report” on 
how the information is used.  That is, a “consumer report” is any com-
munication bearing on a consumer’s character or general reputation 
which is used or collected for credit evaluation, employment screening, 
 
 49. SOLOVE, supra note 43, at 41. 
 50. Id. at 168–69. 
 51. Id. at 169. 
 52. TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY IN THE 
FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM vii–viii, 45–49 (2004) (footnote omitted). 
 53. Robert O’Harrow Jr., In Age of Security, Firm Mines Wealth of Personal Data, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 20, 2005, at A1. 
 54. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (2000). 
 55. Id. § 1681a(f). 
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insurance underwriting, or licensing.56  Although the FCRA was passed 
to limit the uses of personal information in evaluating people, a literal 
reading of its definition of “consumer report” makes the law inapplicable 
if information is used for an unauthorized purpose beyond those enu-
merated in the FCRA.  One could argue, for instance, that a criminal us-
ing credit information for fraud has not triggered the FCRA because 
fraud is not an authorized use.  These problems in the definition of “con-
sumer report” have allowed data brokers to avoid being regulated by the 
FCRA. 
The FBI uses similar reasoning to evade protections of the FCRA.  
In a memo justifying the agency’s reliance on services provided by com-
mercial data broker ChoicePoint, the agency reasoned:  “In this instance, 
none of the information which the FBI would seek to review has been 
collected by ChoicePoint for any of the [FCRA] purposes.”57  The FBI 
further concludes that ChoicePoint is not a consumer reporting agency:  
“Because ChoicePoint does not collect ‘public record information’ for 
any of the highlighted purposes [under the FCRA], ChoicePoint is not 
acting as a ‘consumer reporting agency’ for the purposes of the FCRA, 
and the collected information therefore does not constitute a ‘consumer 
report.’”58 
In the absence of statutory regulation, data brokers have adopted 
self-regulatory rules known as the Individual Reference Services Group 
(IRSG) Principles.59  The Principles set forth a weak framework of pro-
tections, allowing companies to sell nonpublic personal information 
“without restriction” to “qualified subscribers,” which includes law en-
forcement agencies.60  Qualified subscribers need only state a valid pur-
pose for obtaining the information and agree to limit redissemination of 
information.61  Under IRSG Principles, individuals can only opt-out of 
the sale of personal information to the “general public,” but ChoicePoint 
 
 56. Id. § 1681a(d) (emphasis added); see also id. § 1681b(a)(3)(A)–(E).  For an account of other 
limitations of the FCRA, see Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or 
Frontier for Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 210–13 (1992). 
 57. OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NAT’L SEC. LAW UNIT, GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE OF 
CHOICEPOINT FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OR FOREIGN COUNTERTERRORISM 
INVESTIGATIONS 12–13 (2001), available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpfbia.pdf. 
 58. Id. at 13 (footnote omitted).  A strong argument can be made that these interpretations are 
flawed.  The provisions of the FCRA governing law enforcement access make it clear that Congress 
intended procedural safeguards against disclosure of credit information, regardless of its intended use.  
As noted in the review of federal privacy law and access to commercial information done by the Cen-
ter for Democracy & Technology, some courts have ruled that when information is collected for con-
sumer reporting purposes, it remains a consumer report, despite the fact that it may be employed for 
non-FCRA purposes.  James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and National Security, 72 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1477 (2004). 
 59. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, INDIVIDUAL REFERENCE SERVICES: A REPORT TO 
CONGRESS (1997), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/privacy/wkshp97/irsdoc1.htm. 
 60. INDIVIDUAL REFERENCE SERVICES GROUP, IRSG PRINCIPLES, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/ 
privacy/wkshp97/irsdoc2.htm#A%20The%20IRSG%20Principles (last visited Sept. 13, 2005). 
 61. Id. 
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does not consider its customers to be members of the general public.62  
The IRSG Principles were carefully crafted in order to ensure maximum 
flexibility by commercial data brokers.  They have failed to set forth a 
reasonable degree of protection for individuals, and in fact, it was while 
data brokers were operating under these principles that the major pri-
vacy breaches occurred. 
The FCRA also fails to provide sufficient protection against identity 
theft, a crime that is rising at an alarming rate.  Identity theft involves the 
use of a victim’s personal information to improperly access accounts, ob-
tain credit in the victim’s name, or otherwise engage in transactions by 
masquerading as the victim.  In 2003, the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) estimated that “almost 10 million Americans have discovered that 
they were the victim of some form of ID Theft within the past year.”63  
The FCRA, unfortunately, does little to prevent identity theft or to 
minimize its impact on victims once it occurs.  Under the Fair and Accu-
rate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) of 2003, which amended FCRA, 
individuals can now obtain a free credit report once a year from each of 
the three major consumer reporting agencies (Equifax, Trans Union, and 
Experian) online.64  Individuals can also place a fraud “alert” on their re-
cords if they are victimized by identity theft, but such alert “is often as 
simple as a mere entry in the ‘100-word statement’ box in credit files 
that’s made available to consumers who disagree with an entry made in 
their credit file.”65  Moreover, the alert does not stop activity in a per-
son’s file.  Instead, it acts as a warning to a retailer that it should exercise 
more care in granting credit.  A savvy identity thief could continue com-
mitting more fraud even with the alert present.  Indeed, Linda and Jay 
Foley of the Identity Theft Resource Center found that consumer report-
ing agencies ignored fraud alerts in a significant number of cases.66 
The Privacy Act also suffers from many problems that limit its ef-
fectiveness.  It only applies to the federal government and to private 
companies that are administering a system of records for the govern-
ment.67  Thus, when the information originates from the government and 
is transferred to a private company, then Privacy Act requirements apply 
to the contractor.68  However, a database of information that originates 
at a data broker would not trigger the requirements of the Privacy Act.  
Beyond data brokers, consumer reporting agencies are specifically ex-
 
 62. Letter from Gina Moore, ChoicePoint, Inc. to Chris Hoofnagle, Director, Electronic Privacy 
Information Center 1 (Feb. 21, 2003), available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cp_nooptout.pdf. 
 63. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT 4 (Sept. 2003), available 
at www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/synovatereport.pdf.  For an excellent account of the rise of identity theft, 
see BOB SULLIVAN, YOUR EVIL TWIN: BEHIND THE IDENTITY THEFT EPIDEMIC (2004). 
 64. 15 U.S.C. § 1681j (2000). 
 65. SULLIVAN, supra note 63, at 85. 
 66. IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CENTER, IDENTITY THEFT: THE AFTERMATH 2004 16 (Sept. 
2004), available at http://www.idtheftcenter.org/aftermath2004.pdf. 
 67. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(m) (2000). 
 68. Id.; see, e.g., Modification M001, http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02d.pdf. 
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empted from being considered a federal contractor for systems of re-
cords.69 
This limitation to the Privacy Act is critical—it allows data brokers 
to amass huge databases that the government is legally prohibited from 
creating.  Then, when the government needs the information, it can re-
quest it from the data broker.  At that point, the personal information 
would be subject to the Privacy Act, but law enforcement and intelli-
gence agencies have special exemptions under the Privacy Act that limit 
access, accuracy, and correction rights.70  For example, law enforcement 
agencies “may promulgate rules . . . to exempt any system of records [in-
volving information about criminal investigation or criminal history] 
within the agency from [most] part[s] of [the Privacy Act].”71 
The Privacy Act’s attempt to rein in the use of SSNs has been a fail-
ure.  One of the primary reasons is that the Privacy Act fails to restrict 
the use of SSNs by businesses or other private sector entities.  Such a re-
striction was proposed during the creation of the Privacy Act, but Con-
gress failed to include it.72  Today, SSNs are routinely used by businesses 
and other entities, often as a password to gain access to accounts. 
Another limitation is that the Privacy Act only applies to federal, 
not state or local, government agencies.  Moreover, the Privacy Act has a 
number of major exceptions, including one that exempts agencies when 
they disclose information for “any routine use” that is “compatible” with 
the purpose for which the agency gathered the data.73  As Robert Gell-
man has observed:  “This vague formula has not created much of a sub-
stantive barrier to external disclosure of personal information. . . . Later 
legislation, political pressures, and bureaucratic convenience tended to 
overwhelm the law’s weak limitations.”74 
In sum, the database industry is increasingly straining the regulatory 
regime for information privacy established in the early 1970s.  The exist-
ing regime has struggled to address the rise of new data-trafficking com-
panies apart from consumer reporting agencies, the burgeoning coopera-
tion of businesses with the government for intelligence and law 
enforcement operations, and the increase in the uses of personal data.  
While privacy laws passed after the 1970s apply to specific kinds of re-
cords such as video rental records and cable television records, most of 
these laws fail to cover the database industry.75  The Model Regime we 
 
 69. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(m)(2) (2000). 
 70. Id. § 552a(k). 
 71. Id. § 552a(j). 
 72. SMITH, supra note 6, at 297. 
 73. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3). 
 74. Robert Gellman, Does Privacy Law Work?, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW 
LANDSCAPE 198 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997). 
 75. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2000) (cable records); Children’s 
Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2000) (Internet Web sites gathering data 
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propose in the pages that follow is designed to address the gaps and limi-
tations in existing law. 
III. THE MODEL REGIME 
A. Notice, Consent, Control, and Access 
1. Universal Notice 
a. Problem 
There is no general knowledge about the companies using personal 
information.  In order to grant consent, gain access, or otherwise exercise 
one’s rights with regard to personal information maintained by data bro-
kers, consumer reporting agencies, and other institutions, people must 
know what institutions are collecting their data.  Providing such rights 
without knowledge of the companies will be meaningless.  For example, 
in the ChoicePoint security scandal, most people had no idea that Choic-
ePoint existed, let alone that it was collecting and selling their personal 
data.  Moreover, as the ChoicePoint security scandal demonstrates, data 
brokers routinely sell personal information with little oversight about 
who may receive the data and how it will be used.  The problems of such 
a system were emphatically illustrated in Remsburg v. Docusearch,76 
where a data broker was employed by a stalker to locate and murder 
Amy Boyer.  ChoicePoint has invited a national debate and discussion 
about data brokers, but such a discussion cannot meaningfully take place 
unless people are informed about what information companies have and 
what they do with that information. 
b. Legislative Mandate 
To ensure meaningful access, opt-out, and other rights, there must 
be a way to provide people with notice about all of the companies col-
lecting their information. 
c. Specific Solution 
Any company primarily engaged in interstate collection, mainte-
nance, and/or sale of personally identifiable information shall register 
with the FTC.  Such registration shall include the nature of personal in-
formation collected, the name and contact information for the data con-
troller, as well as a clear and concrete description of the uses to which the 
information is put.  Data brokers shall also disclose the types of busi-
 
about children under 13); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710–2711 (video re-
cords). 
 76. 149 N.H. 148, 152–53 (2003). 
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nesses and entities to whom they disclose personal information, as well as 
what safeguards they have in place for vetting those entities that receive 
the data.  This information shall be publicly disclosed by the FTC on a 
Web site and in printed materials. 
2. Meaningful Informed Consent 
a. Problem 
Many data transfers and uses by companies occur without the 
meaningful informed consent of consumers.  The current regime of al-
lowing consumers to opt-out of data sharing, as embodied in the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act,77 is ineffective.  The incentives are such that companies 
benefit if they make opting out as cumbersome as possible and do not 
adequately inform people about the uses of their data.  As a result, very 
few people opt-out, and those who try find the process difficult and time-
consuming. 
b. Legislative Mandate 
There must be a way to ensure that consumers can exercise mean-
ingful informed consent about the uses and dissemination of their per-
sonal information. 
c. Specific Solution 
Companies that collect personal information should be required to 
first obtain an individual’s consent before using it for an unrelated sec-
ondary use, except for reasonable investigation of fraud.  To the extent 
that companies endeavor to use personal information for secondary uses 
without first obtaining individual consent, such uses shall be specifically 
authorized by statute or regulation.  For all new uses of personal infor-
mation, companies must either be authorized by statute to engage in such 
a use or seek the consent of the individual to whom the information per-
tains.  When a company engages in any new use authorized by statute, it 
shall disclose such expansion in use immediately to the FTC, and the 
change shall be displayed clearly on the FTC Web site so that individuals 
are aware of the change. 
 
 77. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b) (2000). 
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3. One-Step Exercise of Rights 
a. Problem 
There are hundreds, possibly thousands, of companies that collect 
and trade in personal information.  To the extent that the law provides 
people with rights of access, opt-in, opt-out, limitation of use and trans-
fer, and so on, these rights must currently be exercised one-at-a-time at 
each individual company.  For example, under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act, people have a right to opt-out of the transfer of their data to third 
parties for marketing purposes.78  Many people have dealings with a mul-
titude of financial institutions, and opting out of each one can be onerous 
and time-consuming.  When data brokers are brought into the fold, the 
exercise of such rights becomes exponentially more difficult.  Imagine 
the time it would take to opt-out with hundreds of different companies.  
This example merely involves opt-out; there are many other rights that 
people exercise as well, and exercising all such rights with the multitude 
of companies individually will prove nearly impossible and time-
prohibitive. 
b. Legislative Mandate 
To ensure the meaningful exercise of rights with regard to personal 
information, there must be a centralized system for exercising these 
rights in an efficient and easy manner. 
c. Specific Solution 
In conjunction with universal notice, the FTC shall develop a cen-
tralized mechanism for people to exercise their rights with respect to 
their personal information.  Such a mechanism would mimic the Do Not 
Call Web site, which allows individuals to opt-out of telemarketing and 
verify their enrollment by visiting a single Web site.  Similarly, individu-
als should be able to enroll in a centralized do-not-share registry.  Other 
rights, to address security risks, including access and correction, will have 
to be administered by the individual companies maintaining personal 
data.  The centralized mechanism will simply provide a pointer to in-
structions on how to exercise these rights with the companies maintain-
ing the data. 
Those seeking to access any personal information collected on the 
centralized mechanism for purposes other than those for which the 
mechanism was created must first obtain a court order.  Only specifically 
enumerated and approved purposes will be authorized.  As for law en-
forcement access to the data, officials will be required to demonstrate 
 
 78. Id. 
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probable cause and obtain only as much information as necessary to 
meet the needs articulated in the showing of probable cause. 
4. Individual Credit Management 
a. Problem 
As the ChoicePoint snafu illustrates, individuals are not in control 
of the basic information that is used for credit identification authentica-
tion.  Numerous individuals and companies can access a person’s credit 
information without that person’s knowledge.  Identity thieves take ad-
vantage of this system when they can seek loans or credit cards with 
creditors, who check the victim’s credit without informing the victim.  
Such credit checks are often the beginning step in an identity theft.  Be-
cause these checks can occur without the victim’s knowledge or consent, 
the identity thief can readily obtain credit in the victim’s name surrepti-
tiously.  Many identity thefts would be stopped at their incipiency if only 
the victim had known about the access to the victim’s credit records and 
could have blocked such access.  Moreover, the problem exacerbates 
identity thefts after they are underway because victims are unaware that 
they have been victimized until months or years later. 
b. Legislative Mandate 
To ensure effective individual management of consumer reporting, 
there must be a way for individuals to know when entities attempt to ac-
cess their credit records and to have the ability to block such access. 
c. Specific Solution 
First, notice shall be issued whenever any new person or entity 
makes an inquiry on or accesses the consumer report of another.  The in-
dividual can choose to receive such notice by mail, telephone, or email.  
Second, unless individuals choose otherwise, credit records shall be “fro-
zen,” whereupon they can only be accessed by others after the individual 
has preapproved the release of such records.  Third, to guarantee maxi-
mum possible accuracy of consumer reports, individuals should be enti-
tled to free credit monitoring if they choose. 
5. Access to and Accuracy of Personal Information 
a. Problem 
ChoicePoint and other data brokers collect detailed dossiers of per-
sonal information on practically every American citizen.  Most people 
have not even heard of these companies.  Even if they do know about 
these companies, people have no way of knowing what information is 
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maintained about them, why it is being kept, how long it is being main-
tained, to whom it is being disseminated, and how it is being used.  The 
records maintained by these companies can have inaccuracies.  This 
would not matter much if the information were never used for anything 
important.  However, the data is being used in ways that directly affect 
individuals—by the government for law enforcement purposes and by 
private investigators for investigation. 
b. Legislative Mandate 
There must be a way for individuals to ensure that their personal in-
formation, that is maintained by various data brokers, is maintained ac-
curately and is not kept for an unreasonable amount of time. 
c. Specific Solution 
Individuals shall, in a centralized manner, be able to access their in-
formation and an accounting of disclosures from data brokers at no cost.  
Data brokers must limit the amount of time they maintain personal in-
formation to a reasonable period.  As with consumer reporting agencies 
under the FCRA, a procedure shall be developed for individuals to cor-
rect inaccuracies in their records. 
B. Security of Personal Information 
6. Secure Identification 
a. Problem 
Businesses and financial institutions currently grant access to peo-
ple’s records when the accessor merely supplies a SSN, date of birth, 
mother’s maiden name, or other forms of personal information that is ei-
ther available in public records or sold by data brokers.  This makes the 
repositories of individuals’ personal data and their accounts woefully in-
secure, as identity thieves can readily obtain the information needed to 
gain access and usurp control.  As the ChoicePoint security scandal illus-
trates, SSNs and other personal information about hundreds of thou-
sands of people can readily fall into the hands of identity thieves. 
b. Legislative Mandate 
There must be a way to prevent readily available pieces of personal 
information from being used as passwords to gain access to people’s re-
cords and accounts. 
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c. Specific Solution 
Companies shall develop methods of identification which (1) are 
not based on publicly available personal information or data that can 
readily be purchased from a data broker, and (2) can be easily changed if 
they fall into the wrong hands.  Whereas an individual’s SSN cannot be 
changed without significant hassle, and date of birth and mother’s 
maiden name cannot be changed, identifiers such as passwords can be 
changed with ease.  Furthermore, they are not universal, and thus a thief 
with a password cannot access all of a victim’s accounts—only those with 
that password.  Biometric identifiers present problems because they are 
impossible to change.  If they fall into the wrong hands, they could prove 
devastating for victims as well as present ongoing risks to national secu-
rity.  Therefore, passwords are a cheap and effective way to limit identity 
theft and minimize the problems victims face in clearing up the damage 
caused by identity theft. 
7. Disclosure of Security Breaches 
a. Problem 
When companies suffer security breaches that result in personal in-
formation being leaked or falling into the hands of unauthorized third 
parties, the people to whom the personal information pertains are made 
more vulnerable to fraud and identity theft.  They often are unaware of 
this and are unable to take steps, such as monitoring their consumer re-
ports, to protect themselves.  This was dramatically illustrated by the 
ChoicePoint security breach, which apparently was the second time the 
company had sold personal information to criminals.  The first incident 
occurred in 2002 and only recently came to public light in the context of 
the second breach, which had to be disclosed under California’s informa-
tion security breach disclosure requirements.79  ChoicePoint is not the 
only commercial data broker that has disclosed records to others im-
properly—in 2002 and 2003 two individuals were able to crack commer-
cial data broker Acxiom’s databases, leading to the release of twenty mil-
lion customer records, some of which contained SSNs.80 
b. Legislative Mandate 
There must be a way for individuals to learn about security breaches 
that result in the leakage or improper access of their personal data. 
 
 79. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29 (West 2005). 
 80. O’HARROW, supra note 37, at 71–72. 
SOLOVE.DOC 2/2/2006  4:27:56 PM 
374 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2006 
c. Specific Solution 
Companies shall be placed under an affirmative obligation to pro-
vide direct notice to the individuals whose data has been leaked or im-
properly accessed.  Such a statute could be modeled on California’s in-
formation security breach law.81  Individuals should also receive a copy of 
the dossier or information given to the unauthorized party. 
C. Business Access to and Use of Personal Information 
8. Social Security Number Use Limitation 
a. Problem 
Numerous businesses and organizations demand that a person pro-
vide a SSN and then use that number as a password for access to ac-
counts and data.  Many schools and other organizations use SSNs on 
identification cards, thus ensuring that when a wallet is lost or stolen, 
one’s SSN is exposed.  The use of SSNs is so extensive that simple trans-
actions, such as signing up for cell phone service, often require disclosing 
one’s SSN. 
b. Legislative Mandate 
There must be a way to reduce the use of SSNs by private sector 
businesses. 
c. Specific Solution 
Unless specifically authorized by statute or regulation, businesses 
and other privacy sector entities shall be barred from using SSNs for 
identification purposes.  A useful starting point is the framework of pro-
tections for the SSN embodied in California law.  The law provides a 
panoply of protections for the identifier, including listing prohibitions on 
the publication of the SSN, embedding the SSN in an identification 
document, and limiting the appearance of the identifier in family court 
records.82 
9. Access and Use Restrictions for Public Records 
a. Problem 
Public records were once scattered about the country, and finding 
out information on individuals involved trekking to or calling a series of 
 
 81. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29. 
 82. Id. §§ 1785.11.1, 1785.11.6, 1786.60, 1798.85–.86; CAL. FAM. CODE § 2024.5 (West 2004). 
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different local offices.  Today, massive database companies sweep up the 
data in public record systems and use it to construct dossiers on individu-
als for marketers, private investigators, and the government.  This is what 
ChoicePoint does.  These uses of public records turn the justification for 
public records on its head.  Public records are essential for effective over-
sight of government activities, but commercial data brokers have per-
verted this principled purpose, and public records have now become a 
tool of businesses and the government to watch individuals. 
b. Legislative Mandate 
There must be a way to regulate access and use of public records 
that maximizes exposure of government activities and minimizes the dis-
closure of personal information about individuals. 
c. Specific Solution 
Access to personal information in public records shall be restricted 
for certain purposes.  For example, accessing public records to obtain 
data for commercial solicitation should be prohibited.  Other purposes 
shall be permitted:  monitoring the government, conducting research, 
carrying on educational purposes, tracing property ownership, and other 
traditional noncommercial purposes.  Data brokers obtaining such data 
should be required to promise via contract, in return for receiving such 
data, to be subject to reasonable use restrictions on that data and to de-
mand that those to whom the data is transferred also restrict uses and 
transfers.  Such regulation would have allowed for greater control over 
ChoicePoint’s use of personal data, since it obtained a significant amount 
of its information from public records.  Additionally, federal, state, and 
local agencies that maintain public record systems must make substantial 
efforts to limit the disclosure of SSNs, phone numbers, addresses, and 
dates of birth. 
10. Curbing Excessive Uses of Background Checks 
a. Problem 
Background checks are cheaper now than ever before, which leads 
to a situation where individuals are being screened for even menial jobs.  
We risk altering our society to one where the individual can never escape 
a youthful indiscretion or a years-old arrest, even for a minor infraction.  
Pre-employment screens are frequently being used by employers even 
for jobs that do not involve participating in security-related functions, 
handling large sums of money, or supervising children or the elderly. 
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b. Legislative Mandate 
There must be a way to limit the use of background checks to those 
jobs where there is a reasonable and justifiable need. 
c. Specific Solution 
Background checks should only be performed in contexts where fi-
duciary relationships are involved, where a large amount of money is 
handled, where employment involves care taking, or any of the national 
defense and security related jobs enumerated by the Employee Poly-
graph Protection Act of 1988.83  Whether background checks are per-
formed by employers or by companies hired to do the screening, the em-
ployee or prospective employee shall receive a copy of the actual 
investigation. 
11. Private Investigators 
a. Problem 
Private investigators routinely access personal information about 
individuals from data brokers.  Private investigators often operate with-
out the extensive regulation that public law enforcement officials must 
heed.  In some states, they are not subject to licensure; in others they are 
subject only to a pro forma process.  As a result, they can be a source of 
great abuses.  The Rebecca Schaeffer incident that sparked the passage 
of the Drivers’ Privacy Protection Act demonstrates the problem.  A pri-
vate investigator obtained actress Rebecca Schaeffer’s home address 
from a state DMV office.84  The investigator was working for a stalker 
who used the information to go to Schaeffer’s home and murder her.85  
More recently, Amy Boyer was murdered by a stalker who had hired 
private investigators to locate her.86 
b. Legislative Mandate 
There must be a system that ensures greater accountability in the 
private investigator profession. 
 
 83. 29 U.S.C. § 2006 (2000) (listing jobs involving national defense and security). 
 84. See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 
86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1191 (2002). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Remsburg v. Docusearch, 149 N.H. 148, 152–53 (2003). 
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c. Specific Solution 
Each state should be required to establish minimum standards for 
licensure and oversight of the private investigator industry.  Such stan-
dards should address the use of pretexting (pretending to be another per-
son in order to gain access to someone’s account or to gain information), 
establish a duty of care to those who are investigated, and prohibit the 
use of invasive practices, such as sorting through individuals’ trash, em-
ploying electronic listening devices, etc. 
D. Government Access to and Use of Personal Data 
12. Limiting Government Access to Business and Financial Records 
a. Problem 
Increasingly, the government is gathering personal information 
from businesses and financial institutions.  Companies such as Choice-
Point have multimillion dollar contracts with government agencies to 
supply them with personal information.  The Fourth Amendment is often 
inapplicable because in a series of cases, including United States v. 
Miller87 and Smith v. Maryland,88 the Court has held that whenever a 
third party possesses personal information, there is no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy.  In the Information Age, it is impossible to live without 
extensive information about one’s life existing in the hands of various 
third parties:  phone companies, cable companies, Internet service pro-
viders, merchants, booksellers, employers, landlords, and so on.  Thus, 
the government can increasingly obtain detailed information about peo-
ple without ever entering their homes. 
b. Legislative Mandate 
There must be a way to engage in electronic commerce and routine 
transactions without losing one’s expectation of privacy in personal data. 
c. Specific Solution 
Whenever the government attempts to access personal information 
from third parties that maintain record systems of personal information 
(databases or other records of personally identifiable information on 
more than one individual), the government should be required to obtain 
a special court order that requires probable cause and particularized sus-
picion that the information sought involves evidence of a crime.  Excep-
 
 87. 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976). 
 88. 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979). 
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tions should exist for reasonable law enforcement needs, including emer-
gency circumstances. 
13. Government Data Mining 
a. Problem 
The government is increasingly researching, planning, and initiating 
data-mining endeavors.  Data mining entails combining and analyzing 
various records of personal information for suspicious patterns of behav-
ior.89  This was envisioned on a grand scale with the Total Information 
Awareness project.  Due to a public outcry, Congress nixed the program 
from the public budget.  But a recent Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) report, as well as the Technology and Privacy Advisory Commit-
tee report, demonstrates that a number of government data-mining pro-
grams are underway.90  Data mining threatens to undermine a longstand-
ing Fourth Amendment principle, which holds that dragnet searches—
those without prior particularized suspicion—are impermissible.91  Be-
cause there are serious inaccuracies in dossiers created by commercial 
data brokers, innocent people may be swept into these dragnets.  Fur-
thermore, the profiles and algorithms used to determine suspicious pat-
terns of behavior are often kept secret, thus impeding public accountabil-
ity or judicial oversight, and providing no way to determine the extent of 
use of certain factors such as race, religion, and First Amendment activ-
ity. 
b. Legislative Mandate 
There must be a way to ensure that government data mining does 
not permit law enforcement to engage in dragnet searches for prospec-
tive crimes.  Where data mining is employed, it should occur in as open a 
manner as possible and have adequate judicial oversight and public ac-
countability. 
c. Specific Solution 
Subject to judicial oversight and normal search warrant require-
ments, prospective subject-based data mining should be permitted.  Sub-
ject-based data mining involves analyzing records where a specific indi-
vidual or individuals are identified and there is particularized suspicion 
 
 89. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DATA MINING: FEDERAL EFFORTS COVER A WIDE RANGE 
OF USES 4 (2004). 
 90. Id. at 2–3; see TECH. AND PRIVACY ADVISORY COMM., SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY IN THE 
FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM ix (2004), available at www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/20040300tapac. 
pdf. 
 91. Id. at 22. 
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that they are involved in criminal activity.92  Pattern-based data mining 
presents greater difficulties.  Prospective pattern-based data mining in-
volves analyzing record systems for various suspicious patterns of activity 
and then investigating those individuals who meet the particular pattern 
or profile.93  Pattern-based data mining should be generally prohibited, as 
it involves a dragnet search.  However, with appropriate judicial supervi-
sion, and with a way to preserve the principle of particularized suspicion, 
pattern-based data mining should be permitted in cases where there are 
specific and articulable facts that a particular crime will or has occurred, 
that a particular limited type of record system (not a broad dossier) has 
information that is necessary to the investigation (no alternatives are 
available), and where the inquiry into the record system is limited.  Data-
mining profiles must be approved by a court prior to their use and must 
be revealed to the public once the investigation is over.  Moreover, as is 
currently done with wiretapping, government agencies engaging in data 
mining shall produce annual public reports to Congress describing the 
frequency and nature of their data mining activities. 
14. Control of Government Maintenance of Personal Information 
a. Problem 
The Privacy Act of 1974 is riddled with loopholes.  Despite a re-
quirement that government agencies disclose new record systems, they 
can readily avert other substantive requirements simply by declaring that 
they want to exempt these records.  For instance, in 2003, the Justice De-
partment administratively discharged the FBI of its statutory duty to en-
sure the accuracy and completeness of over 39 million criminal records it 
maintains in its National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database.94  
That database provides over 80,000 law enforcement agencies with access 
to data on wanted persons, missing persons, gang members, as well as in-
formation about stolen cars, boats, and other information.  Aside from 
agencies exempting themselves from the requirements of the Privacy 
Act, agencies have also employed the “routine use” exemption in such a 
broad fashion that it contravenes the intent of the Privacy Act.  Another 
limitation of the Privacy Act is that it is very difficult for plaintiffs to ob-
tain remedies.  Plaintiffs must prove a “willful or intentional” violation of 
the Act,95 which is difficult since many agency actions are negligent or 
reckless.  Moreover, in Doe v. Chao,96 the Court held that plaintiffs suing 
 
 92. See MARY DEROSA, DATA MINING AND DATA ANALYSIS FOR COUNTERTERRORISM 5 
(2004), available at www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/20040300csis.pdf. 
 93. See id. at 4–5. 
 94. Exemption of Federal Bureau of Investigation Systems—Limited Access, 28 C.F.R. § 16.96 
(2004). 
 95. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (2000). 
 96. 540 U.S. 614, 627 (2000). 
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for violations of the Privacy Act must prove actual loss in order to obtain 
minimum damages of $1,000 under the Privacy Act.  Although many 
plaintiffs whose personal information is leaked by an agency suffer emo-
tional distress, such emotional distress is not sufficient to constitute an 
actual loss for many courts.  Accordingly, such plaintiffs are left without 
a remedy. 
b. Legislative Mandate 
There must be meaningful regulation that limits the collection of 
personal data, lists acceptable uses, guarantees accuracy, provides secu-
rity, and restricts retention of personal information by government agen-
cies, especially since they are acquiring more and more data about indi-
viduals. 
c. Specific Solution 
The Privacy Act must be updated.  Over thirty years have gone by 
without a major reexamination of the Privacy Act, and one is sorely 
needed.  Congress should empanel a new Privacy Protection Study 
Committee to examine government use of personal information compre-
hensively and make recommendations for legislation to update the Pri-
vacy Act.  Specific changes shall include, but shall not be limited to:  (1) 
limiting the routine use exception; (2) addressing the outsourcing of per-
sonal information processing to private-sector businesses; (3) strengthen-
ing the enforcement provisions of the Act; and (4) overturning Doe v. 
Chao97 so that violations of the Act are remedied by minimum-damages 
provisions. 
E. Privacy Innovation and Enforcement 
15. Preserving the Innovative Role of the States 
a. Problem 
The recently enacted amendments to the FCRA preempted more 
protective state laws.  As a result, states are less able to pass effective 
identity theft and privacy protections. 
b. Legislative Mandate 
The ability of states to innovate and experiment new approaches to 
privacy protections must be preserved. 
 
 97. See id. 
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c. Specific Solution 
Most privacy protections in America have been created by state leg-
islatures.  The security breach law that resulted in ChoicePoint disclosing 
the recent sale of personal information to criminals was developed in 
California.  Many of the most important protections in the FCRA origi-
nated in the states.  Indeed, as Justice Brandeis once noted:  “It is one of 
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State 
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”98  Legisla-
tion crafted to address privacy problems should only employ “floor pre-
emption,” thereby allowing states to innovate more comprehensive pro-
tections for individual rights. 
16. Effective Enforcement of Privacy Rights 
a. Problem 
Often, privacy rights are difficult to enforce.  In many instances, it is 
difficult for victims to establish damages or causation when leaks or im-
proper uses of their personal information result in identity theft or other 
harms.  When a company discloses a person’s data or violates its privacy 
policy by wrongfully transferring data to other companies or not provid-
ing adequate security, it is often difficult to prove actual damages.  As a 
result, companies often lack sufficient accountability and sanctions when 
they engage in wrongdoing.  About half of identity theft victims cannot 
tell how their personal information was even accessed, and thus do not 
know what parties should be pursued legally.  Moreover, it is very diffi-
cult for identity theft victims to prove actual monetary damages even 
though they have spent considerable time fixing the harm and suffered 
great mental distress.  With the ChoicePoint security debacle, people’s 
personal information was sold to identity thieves.  Although many did 
not suffer from identity theft, they still suffered harm, as they are now 
much more vulnerable to identity theft, have considerable mental un-
ease, and must spend significantly more time monitoring their credit and 
accounts over a period that could last years. 
b. Legislative Mandate 
There must be a way to enforce privacy protections with meaningful 
sanctions, as well as meaningful redress to victims. 
 
 98. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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c. Specific Solution 
There should be minimum liquidated damages provisions for com-
panies that violate their privacy policies or that suffer a security breach 
due to negligence.  Statutes must provide for individual redress.  As part 
of an enforcement effort, individuals should be able to obtain an order to 
have a commercial data broker audited.  In the event of leaked informa-
tion, the most effective way to address the problem, in a way that avoids 
extensive class action litigation, is to authorize state attorneys general to 
fine companies and establish a fund where victims can make claims for 
disbursements. 
IV. COMMENTARY 
An earlier iteration of the Model Regime, which was released on 
March 10, 2005, received considerable attention.  It was discussed in tes-
timony at legislatures at the federal and state level.  We received a num-
ber of very thoughtful comments and read many insightful discussions 
across the blogosphere.99  The comments we received range from being 
very supportive of the Model Regime to being very critical.  In this sec-
tion, we respond to some of the comments and criticisms to the Model 
Regime.   
A. General Comments 
Eric Goldman, Assistant Professor at Marquette University School 
of Law, comments that the Model Regime has no cost/benefit analysis.  
He contends that “investments in increased privacy are like investments 
in security—they may end up being infrastructural investments that ulti-
mately prove to be ‘wasted’ investments in terms of social welfare they 
create.”100  Many of the solutions proposed are not very costly.  With re-
spect to those that do impose costs on business, it must be noted that 
identity theft costs businesses tens of billions of dollars a year.101  If the 
solutions have just a moderate effect on identity theft, they could pay for 
themselves. 
Additionally, the business community has been loathe to recognize 
the costs of a lack of privacy to individuals, which includes lost time, frus-
tration with direct marketing, and sometimes an increase in vulnerability 
 
 99. Jim Horning, Chief Scientist at McAfee Research (title listed for identification purposes 
only), and Rich Kulawiec helped us fix grammatical errors, and we are indebted to them for their kind 
efforts. 
 100. E-mail from Eric Goldman, Assistant Professor, Marquette University School of Law, to 
Daniel Solove, Associate Professor, The George Washington University Law School (Mar. 15, 2005, 
06:51 PM) (on file with authors). 
 101. The FTC estimates that identity theft costs businesses about $33 billion each year.  FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION, IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT 6 (2003). 
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to violent crime.  For instance, an anonymous commentator who works 
in the credit industry wrote to us that “since federal law right now does 
not hold them [identity theft victims] liable for fraud accounts or the 
misuse of their accounts, there really is no harm you are protecting 
against.”102  In contrast, we believe that identity theft causes significant 
harm to individuals.  According to estimates, victims spend on average 
175 hours and hundreds of dollars fixing the damage.103  The harm is not 
simply measured in lost dollars; identity theft causes incalculable mental 
distress.  Victims feel helpless, and the ongoing nature of identity theft 
exacerbates these feelings.  Most other crimes have an ending point, in 
which victims can recover and begin to cope.  Identity theft can last for 
years, even after detection, thus creating a perpetual sense of victimiza-
tion that has no apparent ending.  Moreover, victims are often financially 
crippled, and they can no longer engage in many financial transactions 
freely (such as obtaining loans, mortgages, etc.) until the damage to their 
credit is fixed.  We can find little evidence that these costs to the con-
sumer have been adequately taken into account by businesses.  The 
Model Regime aims to force businesses to internalize some of the costs 
they impose on consumers.  To this extent, it increases costs on busi-
nesses, but such increases are justified. 
“Roy Owens” comments on Bruce Schneier’s blog that defamation 
laws could address inaccurate information flows.104  Defamation actions 
are costly to bring, and damages might be hard to prove.  In egregious 
cases where errors result in denial of loans or wrongful arrest, plaintiffs 
might have a powerful case, but defamation law will not provide ade-
quate incentives to protect against many of the smaller errors that often 
crop up in databases.  These errors can cause harm, but not enough to 
support an expensive lawsuit.  We also note that under the FCRA, con-
sumer reporting agencies are shielded from defamation liability, except 
in cases where there was malice or willful behavior.105  This legislative 
bargain gives the consumer reporting agencies flexibility to collect and 
report information as long as they use procedures to ensure “maximum 
possible accuracy.”106 
Eric Grimm, an attorney with Calligaro & Meyering, P.C., and oth-
ers suggest that any regulatory regime would be compromised by the fact 
 
 102. E-mail from Anonymous, to Daniel Solove, Associate Professor, The George Washington 
University Law School (Apr. 4, 2005, 04:41 PM) (on file with authors). 
 103. Janine Benner et al., Nowhere To Turn: Victims Speak Out on Identity Theft: A 
CALPRIG/Privacy Rights Clearinghouse Report (2000), http://privacyrights.org/ar/idtheft2000.htm. 
 104. Posting of Roy Owens to Schneier on Security: ChoicePoint Says “Please Regulate Me,” 
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/03/choicepoint_say.html (Mar. 9, 2005, 04:06 PM).  Bruce 
Schneier is the founder and CTO of Counterpane Internet Security, Inc. and author of numerous 
books on data security.  See BRUCE SCHNEIER, BEYOND FEAR: THINKING SENSIBLY ABOUT SECURITY 
IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (2003); BRUCE SCHNEIER, SECRETS AND LIES: DIGITAL SECURITY IN A 
NETWORKED WORLD (2000). 
 105. 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e). 
 106. Id. § 1681e(b). 
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that agencies may be captured by the companies that they regulate.107  
We do not disagree, but we do not believe that this is a reason to reject 
regulatory solutions.  Agency capture is a risk with any regulatory action.  
Despite agency capture problems, few would argue that we are better off 
without regulatory regimes for food, drugs, the environment, auto safety, 
and the like.  Moreover, the risk of agency capture is mitigated where 
state attorneys general can prosecute wrongdoing, where individuals 
have a private right of action, and where federal regulation is a floor, al-
lowing states to create broader protections.  All of these are central fea-
tures of our Model Regime. 
Matthew Miller, an attorney at Hughes & Luce LLP, blogging on 
Privacy Spot, praises the Model Regime.108  Miller suggests that the 
Model Regime address how long data should be retained by entities.109  
Jim Horning, Chief Scientist of McAfee Research,110 also makes a similar 
suggestion.111  Many privacy laws set an upward limit on the amount of 
time private entities can store personal information, including the Cable 
Communications Policy Act,112 the Video Privacy Protection Act,113 and 
the FCRA.114  We have incorporated this suggestion into the Model Re-
gime. 
Dennis Bailey, author of the book The Open Society Paradox, ar-
gues that “the free flow of data provides significant economic and social 
benefits and regulations that attempt to restrict it only serve to hurt the 
economy.”115  We agree that the collection and use of personal informa-
tion can provide substantial benefits, but we disagree that any regulation 
of the free flow of data will necessarily impede economic development.  
We live in a highly regulated society.  At the time of the New Deal, simi-
lar arguments were made in support of laissez faire.  Indeed, one re-
sponse to the problems of the Industrial Age (pollution, poor working 
conditions, etc.) was that any regulation would injure economic devel-
opment.  Regulation is not necessarily in tension with economic devel-
 
 107. E-mail from Eric Grimm, Attorney, Calligaro & Meyering, P.C., to Daniel Solove, Associate 
Professor, The George Washington University Law School, and Chris Hoofnagle, Director, Electronic 
Privacy Information Center, West Coast Office (Mar. 20, 2005, 04:48 PM) (on file with authors). 
 108. See Matt Miller, Draft of a Model Privacy Regime (Part One) (Mar. 14, 2005), http:// 
privacyspot.com/?q=node/view/593; Matt Miller, Draft of a Model Privacy Regime (Part Two) (Mar. 
14, 2005), http://privacyspot.com/?q=node/view/595. 
 109. Matt Miller, Draft of a Model Privacy Regime (Part Two), supra note 108. 
 110. Title listed for identification purposes only. 
 111. E-mail from Jim Horning, Chief Scientist, McAfee Research, to Daniel Solove, Associate 
Professor, the George Washington University Law School, and Chris Hoofnagle, Director, Electronic 
Privacy Information Center (Mar. 15, 2005, 04:43 PM) (on file with authors). 
 112. 47 U.S.C. § 551(e) (2000). 
 113. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(e) (2000). 
 114. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (2000). 
 115. Dennis Bailey, The Whole Kit and Caboodle—Solove and Hoofnagle Go for Regime Change, 
Mar. 21, 2005, http://www.opensocietyparadox.com/mt/archives/000517.html; see also DENNIS BAILEY, 
THE OPEN SOCIETY PARADOX 157–58 (2004). 
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opment, and many regulations benefit the economy and support innova-
tion where there have been market failures. 
Moreover, the free flow of information and maximization of eco-
nomic development are not the only normative ends of our society.  In-
formation regulation can serve to promote fairness or prevent a panoply 
of types of discrimination.  For example, since the 1970s, it has been ille-
gal under federal anti-discrimination laws to exclusively rely upon an ar-
rest record to make hiring decisions, as minorities are more heavily tar-
geted by law enforcement: 
Blacks and Hispanics are convicted in numbers which are dispro-
portionate to Whites and . . . barring people from employment 
based on their conviction records will therefore disproportionately 
exclude those groups.  Due to this adverse impact, an employer may 
not base an employment decision on the conviction record of an 
applicant or an employee absent business necessity.116 
Dennis Bailey suggests in his blog that personal information should 
generally be public, and that regulation should only focus on the harmful 
uses of personal information: 
If information is being used to deprive someone of their freedoms, 
such as the right to vote or the ability to get a job; or used to de-
fraud someone through identity theft then the full weight of the law 
should be applied.  But to regulate data simply on the basis of pri-
vacy is not something I support.117 
It is not practical to take such an approach.  Limiting the public disclo-
sure of certain data as a precaution is a first line of defense for individu-
als such as judges, workers at medical clinics performing abortions, and 
domestic violence victims.  The use of criminal law alone to address iden-
tity theft has been a failure.  Gartner, Inc., a research firm, estimates that 
far less than one percent of identity thefts result in a conviction.118  A 
United States GAO Report describes in compelling detail the difficulties 
with criminal investigation and prosecution of identity theft cases.119 
Jim Harper, Director of Information Policy Studies at the Cato In-
stitute, comments that regulation “at its best proscribes a set of actions in 
order to prevent harm,” and criticizes regulations that seek to prevent 
behavior not tied to “monetary loss, property loss, or mental distress that 
causes physical symptoms, loss of work, or destruction of family and pro-
 
 116. Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 472 F.2d 631, 632 (9th Cir. 1972); EEOC, Policy Guidance 
No. N-915-061, POLICY GUIDANCE ON THE CONSIDERATION OF ARREST RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT 
DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 4 (1990). 
 117. Bailey, supra note 115. 
 118. Stephen Mihm, Dumpster-Diving for Your Identity, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 21, 2003, at 42.  
The figure is less than one in seven hundred identity thefts resulting in conviction. 
 119. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE SAM JOHNSON, HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, IDENTITY THEFT: GREATER AWARENESS AND USE OF EXISTING DATA ARE 
NEEDED 17–18 (June 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02766.pdf. 
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fessional relationships.”120  Harper contends that common-law torts could 
address the problems much more effectively than our Model Regime of 
regulatory provisions. 
The problem with applying common-law torts is that data privacy 
harms are often ill-defined and under-developed in the common law.  To 
what extent is an individual harmed if an intruder enters her home and 
looks through her papers but does not steal anything and leaves without 
a trace?  To what extent is an individual harmed whose personal data is 
leaked by a company such as ChoicePoint but who thus far has not been 
victimized in an identity theft?  Perhaps the common law could better 
address data privacy if it had a different conception of harm.  As Warren 
and Brandeis noted in their seminal article on privacy, the law evolved to 
address more than just property loss and physical harm.121  After the 
Warren and Brandeis article, the law developed to recognize the more 
incorporeal and emotional harms associated with privacy violations.122  
But the common law has a long way to develop.  It must recognize duties 
on the part of data brokers such as ChoicePoint.  It must address issues 
of causation, as it is often impossible for victims to prove how their iden-
tity was stolen and which companies were responsible for the theft of 
their personal data.  It must develop a concept of harm that does not de-
pend upon severe emotional distress, reputational harm, or actual mone-
tary loss, as such harms are very difficult to prove when people’s data is 
merely leaked, when people are denied access to their information, or 
when people’s information is improperly transferred to other entities.  
Common-law torts can certainly supplement a regulatory regime, but 
they cannot serve as an adequate replacement for it without significant 
development. 
Michael Shankey, CEO of BRB Publications, Inc., a company that 
monitors government record access policies, made significant comments 
on the Model Regime.123  Shankey notes that the Model Regime “would 
be more useful if it recognized the existence of different vendors and 
what they do, rather than to primarily lump them together as ‘data bro-
kers.’”124  Shankey describes five general categories of public record ven-
dors:  (i) “proprietary database vendors,” which are companies that 
“combine public sources of bulk data and/or online access to develop 
their own database product(s)” and “purchase or license records from 
 
 120. E-mail from Jim Harper, Director of Information Policy Studies, The Cato Institute, to 
Daniel Solove, Associate Professor, The George Washington University Law School, and Chris Hoof-
nagle, Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center (Mar. 21, 2005, 3:59 PM) (on file with authors). 
 121. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193–95 
(1890). 
 122. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 392 (1960). 
 123. E-mail from Michael Shankey, Chief Executive Officer, BRB Publications, Inc., to Daniel 
Solove, Associate Professor, The George Washington University Law School, and Chris Hoofnagle, 
Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center (Mar. 3, 2005) (on file with authors). 
 124. Id. 
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other information vendors,”125 (ii) “gateways,” which are companies that 
“provide automated electronic gateway to Proprietary Database Ven-
dors or to government agencies online systems,”126 (iii) “search firms,” 
which are companies that “furnish public record search and document 
retrieval services using online services and/or through a network of spe-
cialists, including their own employees or correspondents,”127 (iv) “verifi-
cation firms,” which are companies that ensure information provided to 
employers and businesses is correct,128 and (v) “private investigation 
firms,” which are companies that “use public records as tools rather than 
as ends in themselves, in order to create an overall, comprehensive ‘pic-
ture’ of an individual or company for a particular purpose.”129  These dis-
tinctions are informative and should be considered when legislative 
packages are introduced to address the field of commercial data brokers.  
We also note that in some cases, commercial data brokers perform many 
of the different functions described by Shankey. 
Although commercial data broker ChoicePoint did not comment on 
the Model Regime, the company did announce a series of changes to its 
business model in March 2005.  ChoicePoint stated that it “will discon-
tinue the sale of information products that contain sensitive consumer 
data, including Social Security and driver’s license numbers, except 
where there is a specific consumer-driven transaction or benefit, or 
where the products support federal, state or local government and crimi-
nal justice purposes.”130  The company also has created “an independent 
office of Credentialing, Compliance and Privacy that will . . . oversee im-
provements in customer credentialing processes, the expansion of a site 
visit-based verification program and implementation of procedures to 
expedite the reporting of incidents.”131 
We think ChoicePoint’s reforms are inadequate to address the pri-
vacy implications of the commercial data broker industry.  First, Choice-
Point’s reforms do not bind the company’s competitors, and so other 
commercial data brokers can continue to sell SSNs and other personal 
information.132  Indeed, ChoicePoint is now at a competitive disadvan-
tage with other lesser-known data brokers, such as Tracers Information 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. News Release, ChoicePoint, ChoicePoint to Exit Non-FCRA, Consumer-Sensitive Data 
Markets; Shift Business Focus to Areas Directly Benefiting Society and Consumers (Mar. 4, 2005), 
available at http://www.choicepoint.com/choicepoint/news.nsf/IDNumber/TXK2005-5381565?Open 
Document. 
 131. Id. 
 132. According to journalist Jonathan Krim:  “So far, neither those moves nor revelations of a 
series of breaches at major banks and universities has curbed a multi-tiered and sometimes shadowy 
marketplace of selling and re-selling personal data that is vulnerable to similar fraud.”  Jonathan Krim, 
Net Aids Access to Sensitive ID Data, Social Security Numbers Are Widely Available, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 4, 2005, at A01. 
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Specialist Inc., Merlin, and Intellius.133  ChoicePoint’s reforms resulted in 
the company forgoing approximately $20 million in revenue.134  Smaller 
companies have not experienced the public attention that ChoicePoint, 
LexisNexis, and Acxiom have received, and thus may not adopt reforms 
to protect consumers. 
Second, ChoicePoint is still going to sell its unregulated “public re-
cords” reports to small businesses, albeit with the SSN or driver’s license 
number “truncated.”135  Large businesses and law enforcement will still 
be able to obtain the full report with sensitive information.  It is not clear 
how the SSN will be truncated.  Some companies obscure the first five 
digits while others block the last four.  Without a full redaction of the 
SSN, it may be possible to piece the SSN together from several sources. 
Third, the public records reports sold by ChoicePoint have been 
shown to be highly inaccurate.  According to a report by Pam Dixon of 
the World Privacy Forum,  ChoicePoint’s public information reports 
have a very high error rate.136  In her sample, 90% of the reports obtained 
contained errors; frequently these errors were serious, such as individuals 
being identified by the wrong sex.137  Dixon’s initial findings are sup-
ported by anecdotal stories of other individuals who have obtained their 
unregulated ChoicePoint reports.  Elizabeth Rosen, a victim of the 
ChoicePoint privacy breach, found that five of the seven pages of her re-
port contained errors.138  Rosen’s report erroneously indicated that she 
was the officer of businesses in Texas, that she maintained private mail 
boxes in Texas and Florida,” and that she owned businesses, including 
“Adopt-A-Classroom.”139  Privacy researcher Richard Smith obtained his 
ChoicePoint report and wrote that his report “contain[ed] more misin-
formation than correct information.”140  Deborah Pierce’s National 
Comprehensive Report from ChoicePoint falsely indicated a “possible 
Texas criminal history.”141 
 
 133. Brian Bergstein, ChoicePoint Tries to Find Its Footing in Anti-Fraud Effort, ASSOC. PRESS, 
Sept. 30, 2005. 
 134. Ann Carrns & Valerie Bauerlien, ChoicePoint Curtails Business, Changes Method to Protect 
Data, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2004, at A10. 
 135. “ChoicePoint will continue to serve most of its core markets and customers, but these actions 
will have an impact on the scope of products offered to some customers and the availability of infor-
mation products in certain market segments, particularly small businesses. The transition will begin 
immediately and is expected to be substantially completed within 90 days.”  News Release, Choice-
Point, supra note 129. 
 136. See Martin H. Bosworth, USA PATRIOT Act Rewards ChoicePoint: “Identity Verification” 
Exposes Consumers to Risks, May 13, 2005, http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2005/patriot01. 
html. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Bob Sullivan, ChoicePoint Files Found Riddled With Errors: Data Broker Offers No Easy 
Way to Fix Mistakes, Either, Mar. 8, 2005, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/7118767. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Posting of Richard Smith to Free Public, http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3b1251464594. 
htm (May 28, 2001, 06:23 PDT). 
 141. Sullivan, supra note 138. 
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Fourth, individuals will have access, but not correction rights, with 
respect to ChoicePoint’s unregulated public information reports.  Choic-
ePoint claims that it cannot correct these reports because they are gener-
ated from public records.  However, this claim is deceptive—the problem 
is that ChoicePoint is mixing up public-record information between indi-
viduals.  The public records are correct, but they are attached to people 
to whom they do not pertain. 
Fifth, nothing binds ChoicePoint to its promise to maintain its re-
formed policies.  In recent years, many large companies including 
eBay.com, Amazon.com, Drkoop.com, and Yahoo.com, changed users’ 
privacy settings or altered privacy policies to the detriment of users.142  
ChoicePoint is legally in a better position to renege on its promises, as it 
does not acknowledge a direct relationship with consumers that could be 
the basis of a legal action.  ChoicePoint’s “consumers” are the businesses 
that buy data from the company. 
Sixth, ChoicePoint is still reserving the right to sell “sensitive” per-
sonal information to businesses in a large number of contexts.  Choice-
Point’s release states that sensitive information will be sold to “[s]upport 
consumer-driven transactions where the data is needed to complete or 
maintain relationships . . . [p]rovide authentication or fraud prevention 
tools to large, accredited corporate customers where consumers have ex-
isting relationships . . . [a]ssist federal, state and local government and 
criminal justice agencies in their important missions.”143  These categories 
articulated by ChoicePoint are broad and ill-defined.  What specifically 
falls under “consumer-driven transactions”?  When is data “needed to 
complete or maintain relationships?”  Under this standard, ChoicePoint 
can decide what constitutes a consumer benefit.  In the past, ChoicePoint 
has declared that selling personal information benefits consumers in the 
aggregate, and thus individuals should have no right to opt-out of Choic-
ePoint’s databases.144  Simply put, ChoicePoint’s idea of what benefits 
consumers differs from what consumers and consumer advocates think 
benefits them. 
Seventh, the ChoicePoint policy allows the company to sell full re-
ports for anti-fraud purposes.  While in theory this exception seems ap-
 
 142. Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Consumer Privacy In the E-Commerce Marketplace, in THIRD ANNUAL 
INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW 1339, 1360 (2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=494883#PaperDownload. 
 143. News Release, ChoicePoint, supra note 130. 
 144. The privacy statement mailed to individuals who request their unregulated AutoTrackXP 
report reads in part: 
We feel that removing information from these products would render them less useful for impor-
tant business purposes, many of which ultimately benefit consumers.  ChoicePoint DOES NOT 
DISTRIBUTE NON-PUBLIC INFORMATION (as defined in the Principles) TO THE 
GENERAL PUBLIC PURSUANT TO SECTION V(C) OF THE PRINCIPLES.  The general 
public therefore has NO direct access to or use of NON-PUBLIC INFORMATION (as defined 
in the Principles) from ChoicePoint whatsoever. 
Letter from Gina Moore to Chris Hoofnagle, supra note 62, at 1. 
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propriate, almost any transaction can have some fraud risk.  If a broad 
fraud exemption is maintained, it will allow the sale of reports even when 
the fraud risk is minimal or a proxy for wishing to collect information for 
some other purpose. 
Finally, ChoicePoint’s proposal does not at all limit sale of personal 
information to law enforcement.  The company continues to sell personal 
information to 7,000 federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.145 
B. Comments on Specific Proposals 
1. Universal Notice 
Eric Goldman questions the breadth of the definition in this pro-
posal and notes that “virtually every Internet company would be covered 
by the standard.”146  We disagree that the standard would cover virtually 
any Internet company.  It would cover any company that has a primary 
business of selling personal information. 
Jim Horning comments that in light of the digital divide, notice 
should be available to those who are not online.147  Because our original 
proposal was based on the use of a Web site to provide such notice, we 
have adjusted the Universal Notice section to ensure that those who are 
offline also receive notice. 
An anonymous commentator who works in the credit industry 
writes that the definition of commercial data broker should not include 
consumer reporting agencies because “they are well known and they 
have specific obligations that cover most of the concerns enumerated in 
your paper.”148  We agree with this assessment.  The purpose of the 
Model Regime is primarily to expand the duties on companies that have 
functions falling outside the FCRA.  However, some portions of the 
Model Regime do impose greater responsibilities on traditional con-
sumer reporting agencies, such as proposal #4. 
2. Meaningful Informed Consent 
Rich Kulawiec suggests that the exemption from consent for fraud 
investigations is too broad; individuals should receive notice when an in-
vestigation does not result in a finding of fraud.149  Kulawiec argues that 
this would prevent baseless uses of data for anti-fraud purposes and al-
low people to correct data that led the business to suspect fraud.  We ad-
 
 145. Testimony of Derek Smith, supra note 38. 
 146. E-mail from Eric Goldman to Daniel Solove, supra note 100. 
 147. ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, COMPILATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS (2002). 
 148. E-mail from Anonymous to Daniel Solove, supra note 102. 
 149. E-mail from Rich Kulawiec, to Daniel Solove, Associate Professor, The George Washington 
University Law School, and Chris Hoofnagle, Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center (Mar. 
12, 2005, 12:53 PM) (on file with authors). 
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justed this principle to allow use without consent for “reasonable” fraud 
investigations.  Providing notice each time a company used data to per-
form some anti-fraud function would be burdensome.  We think requir-
ing a condition of reasonableness for investigations will prevent arbitrary 
uses of personal information under the exemption. 
3. One-Step Exercise of Rights 
“Curt Sampson,” commenting on Bruce Schneier’s blog,150 and Jim 
Horning151 make a number of important points regarding the security of 
any centralized source created to manage privacy rights.  Sampson cor-
rectly points out that such a system will have problems in identifying and 
authenticating individuals who seek access to it.152  In lieu of such a sys-
tem, Sampson proposes that commercial data brokers adopt an opt-in 
business model, where they have to contact the data subjects and estab-
lish a relationship with each.153  We believe that such an alternative might 
result in a barrage of unwanted contact to individuals given the many 
companies that trade in people’s data.  Many of the identification and au-
thentication issues Sampson raises are addressed successfully by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) in its Do-Not-Call Telemarketing Regis-
try.  The FTC uses “automatic number identification” to verify that an 
individual enrolling in the system is calling from the affected number.154 
Serious security issues are not presented by requiring the commer-
cial data brokers to register and provide information about their activi-
ties online.  The security issues arise when individuals can exercise rights 
at the registry.  This can be addressed in several ways.  With respect to 
the congressionally mandated central source for free consumer reports, 
the individual can go to a single Web site, but then be passed off to an 
individual consumer reporting agency for identification and authentica-
tion.  A privacy registry could operate in the same way, with the individ-
ual reading about different commercial data brokers on the central regis-
try, but then pursing the exercise of certain rights (especially access and 
correction) with the individual companies. 
In some instances, the harms from abuse are not significant enough 
to outweigh the benefits of a central registry.  For instance, some direct 
marketing groups objected to the Do-Not-Call Registry on the basis that 
an imposter could secretly opt-out individuals by placing them on the 
Do-Not-Call Registry without their consent.  We think the FTC properly 
 
 150. Posting of Curt Sampson to Schneier on Security: Ideas for Privacy Reform, http://www. 
schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/03/ideas_for_priva.html (Mar 14, 2005, 10:56 PM). 
 151. E-mail from Jim Horning, Chief Scientist, McAfee Research, to Daniel Solove, Associate 
Professor, The George Washington University Law School, and Chris Hoofnagle, Director, Electronic 
Privacy Information Center (Mar. 15, 2005, 07:44 PM) (on file with authors). 
 152. Posting of Curt Sampson to Schneier on Security: Ideas for Privacy Reform, supra note 150. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Privacy Act Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. 37494, 37494 (June 24, 2003). 
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resolved this conflict by still allowing individuals to opt-out without the 
hassle of burdensome authentication because missing some telemarket-
ing is an acceptable harm in exchange for ease of use.  Similarly, with re-
spect to opting out of financial services information sharing, there should 
not be a significant hurdle or a requirement to go to each individual 
company to authenticate and opt-out.  Instead, the FTC could monitor 
enrollments in the system and investigate those who appear to have a 
fraudulent pattern (multiple opt-outs from the same IP address, opt-outs 
that come in alphabetical or numerical order, etc). 
To address Curt Samson’s concerns, we have adjusted the Model 
Regime so that certain rights can be exercised at the centralized system, 
but others will have to be pursued with individual companies. 
“David Mohring,” commenting on Bruce Schneier’s blog, raises a 
different issue with the centralized source:  it could become a honeypot 
for law enforcement and lawyers seeking personal information.155  This 
indeed is a risk.  The FTC, in creating the Do-Not-Call Registry, estab-
lished a routine use allowing the agency to disclose enrollment informa-
tion to law enforcement agencies.156  To avoid a similar development with 
respect to any newly created system, we have altered the Model Regime 
to specify that government officials seeking access to personal informa-
tion in the registration system should be required to obtain a search war-
rant with probable cause and to minimize the data acquisition to only 
that which is needed for a specifically identified law enforcement pur-
pose. 
Rich Kulawiec comments that the Do-Not-Call Registry has a feed-
back loop that our system lacks.157  That is, if one continues to receive 
telemarketing after enrollment, there is a possibility that someone is vio-
lating the law.  He rightly asks what mechanisms will ensure compliance 
with our proposed system.  This is a legitimate concern, but a fully devel-
oped approach would create rights that would help individuals identify 
when something wrong is afoot, and strong penalties (suggested by many 
who commented on the Model Regime) would serve as a deterrent to 
prevent misuse of personal data.  To further develop a feedback mecha-
nism for individuals as data subjects, we have added a provision to the 
access section calling upon commercial data brokers to not only provide 
a copy of a report, but also an accounting of the entities to which it has 
been disclosed.  This right exists in the FCRA context, where the indi-
vidual can obtain a complete list of all entities that received a consumer 
report.158  Therefore, in the access and accuracy section (proposal #5), we 
 
 155. Posting of David Mohring to Schneier on Security: Ideas for Privacy Reform, http://www. 
schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/03/ideas_for_priva.html (Mar. 12, 2005, 06:56 AM). 
 156. Privacy Act Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. at 37496. 
 157. E-mail from Rich Kulawiec to Daniel Solove and Chris Hoofnagle, supra note 149. 
 158. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2) (2000). 
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have added a provision to enable an individual to seek such an account-
ing of a commercial data broker’s disclosures. 
4. Individual Credit Management 
“No id please,” commenting on Bruce Schneier’s blog, notes that 
credit card companies have architected the current credit system that has 
put consumers at risk, and then turned this risk into a business opportu-
nity to market credit monitoring.159  This comment is correct—the infor-
mation business has turned many of its problems into new profit oppor-
tunities, such as identity theft insurance, which can cover lost wages and 
fees associated with remedying the crime.  Dennis Bailey observes:  “I 
use CreditWatch from Experian and it gives me peace of mind.  Of 
course [Solove and Hoofnagle] are asking the companies to give away a 
profitable service for free.”160  It strikes us as unfair for companies to 
make a profit selling a service to protect consumers from problems cre-
ated by these very companies themselves.161  Consumer reporting agen-
cies contend that people’s information would be much more safe and se-
cure if they signed up for the agencies’ credit monitoring services.162  
However, under the FCRA, consumer reporting agencies are required to 
maintain procedures to ensure “maximum possible accuracy,” and no-
where in the statute does it authorize companies to charge a fee for such 
service.163  We believe that under their FCRA duty to maintain the 
maximum possible accuracy, consumer reporting agencies should provide 
free credit monitoring to individuals.164  Therefore, we have added to this 
provision free credit monitoring to individuals who desire such protec-
tion. 
“Matthew B.,” commenting on Bruce Schneier’s blog, argues in sup-
port of the security freeze proposal.165  He points out that it will serve as 
an effective identity theft “detection approach” because it will notify in-
dividuals where there may be wrongdoing.166  Such an approach is useful 
 
 159. Posting of No id please to Schneier on Security: ChoicePoint Says “Please Regulate Me,” 
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/03/choicepoint_say.html (Mar. 9, 2004, 04:12 PM). 
 160. Bailey, supra note 115. 
 161. The Federal Trade Commission has labeled unfair a scheme where marketers sent unwanted 
popup messages to users of Microsoft Windows computers and then offered these users software to 
block the messages, thereby seeking to profit from the very harm the company caused.  See FTC v. D 
Squared Solutions, LLC, No. AMD 03-CV3108 (N.D. Md. Nov. 6, 2003). 
 162. Complaint at Exhibit B, In the Matter of Experian (before the Federal Trade Commission) 
(2003), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/Experian (follow “Exhibit B” hyperlink). 
 163. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2000). 
 164. Letter from Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center, to the 
Federal Trade Commission (Sept. 16, 2003), available at http://epic.org/privacy/experian (arguing that 
a consumer reporting agency promoting its subscription credit monitoring service by capitalizing on its 
own failure to adequately fulfill its duty to maintain maximum possible accuracy violated the Fair 
Consumer reporting Act). 
 165. Posting of Matthew B. to Schneier on Security: Ideas for Privacy Reform, http://www. 
schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/03/ideas_for-priva.html (Mar. 15, 2005, 08:30 AM). 
 166. Id. 
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because in a typical identity theft situation, the impostor will make a 
number of attempts to apply for credit in the victim’s name.  Notice of 
inquiries will alert an individual to wrongdoing; the freeze will stop the 
actual granting of credit, assuming that the impostor cannot himself lift 
the freeze. 
Rich Kulawiec suggests that notice of access or attempted access to 
personal information should not be delivered by e-mail because of secu-
rity risks.167  Our approach would give the individual a choice regarding 
which method of notice could be used; those concerned about e-mail se-
curity could choose notice by postal mail. 
An anonymous commentator who works in the credit industry 
writes that “[r]equiring a notice to be sent by a . . . [consumer reporting 
agency] each time someone makes an inquiry or accesses your consumer 
report is just not practical.”168  The anonymous commentator is correct.  
Our original proposal would have required notice to be given each time a 
company does a routine review of an existing consumer’s credit.  The 
Model Regime is not concerned with routine account review, but rather 
with new accounts of credit and new inquiries made on the file.  We have 
accordingly altered the Model Regime so that new persons or entities 
(those that do not currently have a business relationship with the con-
sumer) that access or make an inquiry on the report will trigger a notice 
to the consumer. 
The same commentator writes that “[a]llowing full consumer con-
trol over their credit file . . . is not practical. . . . because [of] the need to 
have a center available 24/7/365 to allow consumers to have access to 
their file.”169  This would “create a cost structure that would destroy the 
industry.”170  Certainly there will be costs involved with a credit freeze, 
but under the current information architecture, individuals have no tools 
to proactively shield themselves from identity theft.  There are certain 
pressure points that can be used to address identity theft.  One is limiting 
access to personal information, an approach that commercial data bro-
kers have made impractical.  The other approach is to limit access to the 
consumer report, because without it, companies will not grant credit to 
impostors.  We think consumers should have the ability to limit access to 
the reports.  An increasing number of states are in accord with this posi-
tion.171 
 
 167. E-mail from Rich Kulawiec to Daniel Solove and Chris Hoofnagle, supra note 149. 
 168. E-mail from Anonymous to Daniel Solove, supra note 102. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. California, Louisiana, Texas, and Vermont have credit freeze laws.  See CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 1785.11.2–.11.6 (West 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3571.1 (2005); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. 
§ 20.01 (Vernon 2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2480a (2004). 
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5. Access to and Accuracy of Personal Information 
Michael Shankey correctly notes that our original proposal justified 
access, accuracy, and correction rights by listing uses of personal infor-
mation (pre-employment screening and credit granting) that are already 
regulated and subject to the very rights we seek.172  Our reliance on those 
uses of information was misplaced, and thus we have removed those jus-
tifications.  We still think that these rights are appropriate for reports 
sold by commercial data brokers, as law enforcement and other entities 
use them to make decisions affecting people’s lives. 
Shankey also comments that correction rights are difficult to exe-
cute because the “originating data comes from the government agencies 
[and] the database vendor is merely reporting what was in the record.”173  
While it is true that individuals have to pursue correction rights with in-
dividual government agencies, as noted above, much of the problem 
stems from the fact that although the public records are correct, they are 
attached to the wrong individuals. 
6. Secure Identification 
“Anonymous,” commenting on Bruce Schneier’s blog, warns that 
legislative mandates defining security can cause problems because they 
stifle innovation and technological development.174  We agree with this 
comment.  In our Model Regime, we avoided stating specific security 
standards.  Privacy laws that address security standards rarely define spe-
cific security measures; instead, they create a burden to maintain “rea-
sonable procedures.”  These standards place a continuing burden upon 
data collectors to employ good practices rather than set the standards in 
stone.  However, this does not mean that the law must avoid all specific 
measures.  In particular, some existing security measures that have 
proven to be ineffective—such as the use of SSNs as passwords—should 
be specifically limited.  There may be some security measures that have 
proven so effective that they should be required.  Such instances should 
be employed sparingly, as the law should maximize flexibility and con-
tinued security innovation. 
“Gary,” commenting on Bruce Schneier’s blog, suggests that the 
SSN be made public but that the law should prohibit its use as a pass-
word.175  We agree that the SSN should not be used as a password.  How-
 
 172. E-mail from Michael Shankey to Daniel Solove and Chris Hoofnagle, supra note 123. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Posting of Anonymous to Schneier on Security: ChoicePoint Says “Please Regulate Me,” 
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/03/choicepoint_say.html (Mar. 9, 2005, 06:34 PM). 
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Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 80 TEX. L. REV. 89, 120 (2001).  For an 
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ever, the SSN is an individual’s “account number” with the Social Secu-
rity Administration, and making such a financial account number public 
could create opportunities for fraud and abuse. 
Jim Horning and several others are critical of the employment of 
passwords:  (i) users choose bad passwords, (ii) they tend to use the same 
password for many different purposes, and (iii) they forget good pass-
words.176  All of these problems are valid concerns, but the current sys-
tem is a password system that is among the worst that could possibly be 
devised.  SSNs (i) are used as passwords, (ii) are far from secret, (iii) can 
readily be found out with minimal effort, (iv) are very difficult to change, 
and (v) are used on countless accounts and record systems.  The Model 
Regime’s password proposal eliminates several of these problems.  First, 
passwords will vary with different accounts, so a thief finding out a pass-
word will not unlock everything.  Second, passwords can readily be 
changed, so once the identity theft is detected, people can readily render 
the stolen password useless.  Third, it will be much more difficult for the 
average identity thief to guess people’s passwords.  Thieves can of course 
do this, but it will make identity thefts more difficult.  It is difficult to 
completely eliminate identity theft, but the Model Regime makes it much 
harder to engage in and makes it easier for victims to halt it once it hap-
pens.  The problem of forgetting passwords can be addressed by having 
people supply answers to questions such as naming their favorite pet’s 
name or favorite color. 
We have received some interesting technological solutions for iden-
tification and authentication, but we were reluctant to adopt any without 
a more thorough understanding of their implications, feasibility, usabil-
ity, and potential problems.177  We are open to other approaches that 
provide more flexibility and security than passwords.  For now, we be-
lieve that passwords are an easy measure that will have a significant im-
pact on reducing the incidence and severity of identity theft.  While such 
a solution is not perfect, its great virtue is that it supplies a substantial 
advance in effectiveness with relative simplicity. 
 
ture of Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227, 1262–66 (2003).  For LoPucki’s response, see Lynn 
LoPucki, Did Privacy Cause Identity Theft?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1277 (2003). 
 176. E-mail from Jim Horning to Daniel Solove and Chris Hoofnagle, supra note 110; E-mail 
from Scott Minneman, Student, The George Washington University Law School, to Daniel Solove, 
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 177. For example, Jim Horning suggested “PwdHash” as one possible approach to addressing the 
problem of using the same password for different services.  Web Password Hashing, http://crypto. 
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Web sites. 
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7. Disclosure of Security Breaches 
Eric Goldman suggests that individuals be able to control whether 
security breach notifications are received, and the standard for receiving 
notifications should be opt-in.178  We agree that individuals should be 
able to opt-out of receiving notifications, should they wish.  However, 
setting an opt-in standard will give companies an incentive to hide the 
option from the consumer, or charge consumers for receiving this basic 
information.  
In discussions about a federal security breach disclosure law, there 
has been debate concerning when a company should be required to dis-
close a security breach.  Some argue that disclosure should triggered only 
if there is a “reasonable basis of substantial consumer harm” or a “rea-
sonable basis that the disclosure may result in a significant risk of identity 
theft.”  The problem with such thresholds, however, is that they leave the 
determination for “reasonable basis” to self-interested companies.  With 
most of the security breaches that were announced in 2005, the compa-
nies insisted that the risk of identity theft was small to nonexistent.  Thus, 
under such a threshold, hardly any companies would make the disclo-
sure.  Moreover, it is unclear what a "significant risk of identity theft" or 
“substantial consumer harm” means.  If a company decides that it must 
disclose, then it is also conceding that there is a "significant risk" of harm 
from its breach, which is a very difficult thing for a company to concede.  
Instead, most companies will not want to concede that they have created 
a risk of harm to consumers, let alone a significant one, as this will create 
a public relations nightmare.  Given the strong disincentive for compa-
nies to admit publicly that a security breach could cause harm to con-
sumers, a standard involving “harm” would lead to minimal to no disclo-
sures.  Additionally, it is often hard to determine whether a disclosure 
will create a significant risk of identity theft or harm, so nearly all com-
panies that suffer breaches could claim in good faith not to have to dis-
close.  Finally, security breaches may occur for purposes beyond identity 
theft.  Unauthorized access may be sought in order to locate a person, to 
engage in stalking, or to embarrass them. 
8. Social Security Number Use Limitation 
Many wrote to express support of this provision in particular.  Sev-
eral wrote that the SSN should be considered to be compromised be-
cause of its widespread use and availability.  Thus, it should never be 
used as a password. 
 
 178. E-mail from Eric Goldman to Daniel Solove, supra note 100. 
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9. Access and Use Restrictions for Public Records 
No commentary. 
10. Curbing Excessive Uses of Background Checks 
Jim Horning argues that the background check section is not rele-
vant to the problems we aimed to address in the Model Regime.179  How-
ever, the growth of the commercial data broker industry has been in 
large part due to employers performing background checks, even in cases 
where the job has no security function.  Outside the pre-employment 
context, shoddy, electronic-only background checks have become in-
creasingly less expensive.  There has to be some way to put balance back 
into this situation and limit the contexts in which background checks are 
performed. 
Dennis Bailey contends that many nonsecurity jobs could have se-
curity implications; he gives the example of felons working for service 
companies that might assault people in their homes.180  We think that 
some line must be drawn that establishes categories of jobs that are 
available without a background check.  Almost any job imaginable has 
some security implication, but the connection is often attenuated.  We 
think the line that we have drawn, one that allows background checks for 
caretakers, handlers of large sums of money, and for functions articu-
lated by Congress in the Polygraph Act, properly balances employer and 
employee interests. 
Michael Sankey of BRB Publications, Inc. criticizes the background 
check section, and notes that “the employer can be sued for negligent 
hiring if [pre-employment screens] are not done.”181  We think this is pre-
cisely the reason why a line must be drawn.  As pre-employment screen-
ing becomes cheaper, it becomes difficult for employers to refrain from 
engaging in prescreening.  One could foresee the day when even the 
most menial job will require a clean record.  Obviously, if the Model Re-
gime restricts an employer from conducting a background check for a 
particular position, the employer shall not be deemed negligent for not 
conducting one. 
11. Private Investigators 
Jim Horning recommends against limiting the private investigator 
profession, arguing that private investigators are not central to the prob-
lems at issue in the Model Regime.182  We disagree.  Private investigators 
 
 179. E-mail from Jim Horning to Daniel Solove and Chris Hoofnagle, supra note 110. 
 180. Bailey, supra note 114. 
 181. E-mail from Michael Sankey to Daniel Solove and Chris Hoofnagle, supra note 123. 
 182. E-mail from Jim Horning to Daniel Solove and Chris Hoofnagle, supra note 110. 
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are frequent users of the information provided by data brokers.  Too lit-
tle is known about this industry.  Certainly, there are beneficial examples 
of private investigators using personal information (i.e., to locate lost 
children).  But private investigators engage in other practices largely un-
known to the public.  Moreover, there are many instances of private in-
vestigators assisting unscrupulous individuals, stalkers, and others bent 
on violence.  For example, the stalker who murdered Rebecca Shaeffer 
obtained her address from a private investigator.183  We believe that be-
cause private investigators engage in significant use of personal informa-
tion, they should be subject to the Model Regime just like other principal 
users of such data.  Failure to address private investigators would leave a 
significant gap in protection. 
12. Limiting Government Access to Business and Financial Records 
Michael Shankey questions the logic of this section.  He notes that 
requiring the government to obtain court process “is extremely time con-
suming and costly” and that the government “can utilize the services of a 
private sector public record database vendors to do the same search of 
the same government agencies in a fraction of the time for a fraction of 
the cost.”184  But this is exactly our point—access and aggregation have 
tipped the scale of power away from the individual to the government.  
Using public records or information volunteered from private compa-
nies, the government can learn much more about its citizens than it could 
a century or even a decade ago. 
13. Government Data Mining 
The section on government data mining has received much atten-
tion from commentators.  Jim Harper argues in support of our proposal 
that “to the extent [that data mining] means sifting through databases 
trying to discover incipient wrongdoing . . . [it is] probably ineffective.”185  
Others criticize the proposal, arguing that the government should be able 
to employ the same tools that the private sector uses for marketing.  For 
example, Dennis Bailey argues that the idea that restricting government 
data mining would “keep government inefficient by depriving it of tools 
from the private sector” is no longer a widely accepted belief.186  Some of 
the criticism, we think, flows from a misunderstanding of our proposal.  
We have proposed limits on data mining for prospective wrongdoing.  
 
 183. 139 CONG. REC. S15762 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer). 
 184. E-mail from Michael Sankey to Daniel Solove and Chris Hoofnagle, supra note 123. 
 185. E-mail from Jim Harper, Director of Information Policy Studies, The Cato Institute, to 
Declan McCullagh, Chris Hoofnagle, Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center, and Daniel 
Solove, Associate Professor, The George Washington University Law School (Mar. 14, 2005, 01:00 
PM) (on file with authors). 
 186. Bailey, supra note 115. 
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Data mining regularly occurs, and with good reason, to address crimes 
that have already occurred (a form of data matching was used to help 
identify the Washington D.C. area sniper, for instance).  Data mining 
prospectively to interdict future crimes raises profound due process ques-
tions, and it is that practice that we have sought to address in this princi-
ple. 
In his book, Dennis Bailey elaborates on his support for govern-
ment data mining and contends that the problems created by data mining 
can be minimized by avoiding a “centralized data warehouse.”187  Bailey 
observes that the government could search multiple databases with a 
subpoena or court order and “[o]nly when a suspicious pattern turned up 
would an individual be identified, most likely after court approval was 
obtained.”188  This suggestion resembles one made in the Markle Report, 
which recommends against centralization such as in the Total Informa-
tion Awareness program.189  According to the Markle Report, 
“[a]ttempting to centralize this information is not the answer because it 
does not link the information to the dispersed analytical capabilities of 
the network.”190  In other words, the Markle Report suggests that the 
government enlist the assistance of various companies and other entities 
to conduct the data mining.  Moreover, the Markle Report recommends 
that “personally identifiable data can be anonymized so that personal 
data is not seen unless and until the requisite showing . . . is made.”191  
The problem with this suggestion is that merely decentralizing the data-
bases does not provide adequate protection when such information can 
readily be combined at the push of a button.  Such outsourcing of gov-
ernment intelligence functions presents other problems as well, since pri-
vate sector entities lack the openness and accountability of government 
as well as the legal limitations on the collection and use of personal data.  
Anonymizing the identities of data subjects and searching for patterns 
only to identify those suspicious people still involves a dragnet search.  
Concealing the names at the stage of the initial pattern analysis will pro-
vide little meaningful protection because it does not change the dragnet 
nature of the search and because the search for patterns is conducted by 
computers for which the names of the individuals will not be relevant 
anyway. 
 
 187. See BAILEY, supra note 115, at 110. 
 188. Id. 
 189. MARKLE FOUNDATION, CREATING A TRUSTED NETWORK FOR HOMELAND SECURITY: 
SECOND REPORT OF THE MARKLE FOUNDATION TASK FORCE 5–7, 11–12 (2003), available at www. 
markletaskforce.org/reports/TFNS_Report2_Master.pdf. 
 190. Id. at 11. 
 191. Id. at 35. 
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14. Control of Government Maintenance of Personal Information 
Jim Harper observes in agreement that the Privacy Act requires 
significant revision because the Act “is a paper tiger.”192  Harper con-
tends that the Act must be revised “especially in light of the end-run 
made possible by companies like ChoicePoint who do the dossier-
building that the Privacy Act is meant to prevent.”193 
15. Preserving the Innovative Role of the States 
Preemption continues to be one of the more controversial proposals 
in the Model Regime.  Eric Goldman writes, “[s]tates have no business 
trying to regulate privacy. . . . State-based regulation creates a patch-
work-quilt of laws that cannot be reconciled, leading to unnecessary costs 
or a most-restrictive compliance strategy.”194 
Government and businesses have struggled for centuries to draw 
appropriate lines between state and federal regulation.  To simply say 
that the information privacy cannot be subject to state consumer protec-
tion law raises many questions.  The state has played a large historical 
role in protecting consumers.  Why should such a role be rejected in the 
context of information privacy?  What is so unique about e-commerce 
that justifies treating it differently than other interstate commerce, such 
as catalog sales? 
At some level, there is an inconsistency between the data broker in-
dustry’s declarations of their technological capabilities to engage in per-
sonalization and customization with consumer data and their asserted in-
ability to use this same technology to comply with differing state 
consumer privacy laws.  Numerous other industries have faced differing 
state laws and have found ways to comply.  For example, the insurance 
industry has demonstrated that it can offer state-specific quotes online, 
despite the fact that the industry is regulated by all fifty states.  In light of 
this, we remain skeptical that compliance with a “patchwork” is impossi-
ble. 
Moreover, complaints about the difficulties in following the laws of 
all fifty states are often really disguised attacks on the laws of just a few 
states, such as California.  In many cases, only one or two states have 
laws addressing a particular issue that diverge from the norm (or even 
have such laws at all).  Ed Mierzwinski of U.S. PIRG comments that a 
patchwork of state laws is not likely if Congress “does a good enough 
 
 192. E-mail from Jim Harper to Declan McCullagh, Chris Hoofnagle, and Daniel Solove, supra 
note 185. 
 193. Id. 
 194. E-mail from Eric Goldman to Daniel Solove, supra note 100. 
SOLOVE.DOC 2/2/2006  4:27:56 PM 
402 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2006 
job.”195  Mierzwinski reasons that if Congress passes effective laws, the 
states will focus on problems other than privacy. 
Historically, federal privacy laws have not preempted stronger state 
protections or enforcement efforts.  The Electronic Communications Pri-
vacy Act,196 the Right to Financial Privacy Act,197 the Cable Communica-
tions Privacy Act,198 the Video Privacy Protection Act,199 the Employee 
Polygraph Protection Act,200 the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,201 
the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act,202 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act203 all allow states to craft protections that exceed federal law.  Even 
the FCRA allows for stronger state law in many circumstances.204 
Although the federal government has enacted privacy laws, most 
privacy legislation in the United States is enacted at the state level.  
Many states have privacy legislation on employment privacy (drug test-
ing, background checks, employment records), SSNs, video rental data, 
consumer reporting, cable television records, arrest and conviction re-
cords, student records, tax records, wiretapping, video surveillance, iden-
tity theft, library records, financial records, insurance records, privileges 
(relationships between individuals that entitle communications to pri-
vacy), and medical records.205 
States have engaged in significant innovation in addressing con-
sumer protection and privacy issues.  It was the states, not the FTC, that 
first acted to create telemarketing Do-Not-Call lists.  Ed Mierzwinski of 
the U.S. PIRG comments that “the vast majority of 2003 federal FACTA 
[Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act] reforms were first passed in 
the states.”206 
Jim Harper suggests that federal law should neither be a ceiling or a 
floor, allowing states to regulate upward or downward—that is, provide 
their citizens more or less privacy.207  Harper reasons that many people 
choose to have their privacy invaded, and thus states should be able to 
make the choice to provide their citizens less privacy protection.  Such a 
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system, however, would depart significantly from the general approach 
of federal regulation, which provides a minimum floor of protections.  
Under Harper’s suggestion, federal law would amount to little more than 
a recommendation, a guideline that could be followed or rejected by the 
states.  We doubt that such a redefinition of the role of federal law would 
be amenable to Congress.  As for citizens choosing to have less privacy 
protection, we certainly recognize that people may choose different de-
grees of privacy.  We have crafted our Model Regime to afford people 
meaningful choices about their privacy; people are free to reject these if 
they want.  The goal of privacy regulation is to ensure that when people 
do exercise choice with regard to their privacy protection, such choice is 
a meaningful choice, not a one-sided transaction where people are given 
few reasonable options and not enough information to make an informed 
decision. 
16. Effective Enforcement of Privacy Rights 
Several commentators suggested that civil penalties be severe, so as 
to prevent privacy violations from occurring as a “cost of doing busi-
ness.”208  “Rodolphe Ortalo,” commenting on Bruce Schneier’s blog, sug-
gests that company executives be criminally liable for security.209  A sig-
nificant segment of the public agrees that criminal liability is appropriate 
for those who invade privacy.  However, unless there is willful or mali-
cious behavior, we think ordinary civil liability will suffice to deter 
wrongdoing. 
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